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Abstract
This thesis provides a detailed analysis of the gross worker flows data in
the United Kingdom between 1997 and 2010, with particular emphasis
on the 2008-09 recession and its aftermath. Utilising flows data from
the Labour Force Survey (LFS), the dominant macroeconomic factors
driving unemployment in the United Kingdom before, during, and after
the recessionary period are identified. The findings of the thesis are
then reconciled with other theoretical and empirical literature in the
field. Amongst the salient findings of this thesis is a striking decline in
job-to-job movements throughout and beyond the recent recession.
This discovery adds a new dimension to the existing literature in the
field. Other contributions include the use of detrended Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) as the cyclical indicator (as opposed to another labour
market indicator) and a split-sample analysis, which flags some
interesting trend changes in labour market flow movements and
transition rates, even prior to the Great Recession.
Key Words : Worker Gross Flows; Hazard Rates; Job-Finding Rate;
Job-Separation Rate.
JEL Classifications : E24, J60.
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Introduction
The creation of a robust theoretical model of aggregate unemployment
is an issue of foremost importance in macroeconomics. In modelling
aggregate unemployment, there is an obvious place to start: matching
theory. The Nobel Prize in economics was awarded to three pioneering
figures of search theory (Diamond, Mortensen, and Pissarides) in 2010.
This was recognition of the value of models of the labour market with
search frictions in accounting for the observed fluctuations in
unemployment.
The seminal work on matching theory, which forms the basis of
modern macro-models of the labour market, is attributable to
Pissarides (1985) and Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). (A summary of
the theory and work in the field is provided by Pissarides, 2000.) The
behaviour of aggregate unemployment is most commonly viewed
through the lens of search-and-matching theory, as it can account for
employment and wage determination, the simultaneous existence of
vacancies and unemployment, and job creation and job destruction,
within an intertemporal optimising framework. The idea is that the
matching process between firms and workers is a costly process (a type
of search friction): it is costly for an individual to search and it is costly
for a firm to find a suitable person to fill the job. The matching rate
(M ) between workers and firms at time t is, then, a function of the
number of people who are unemployed (U ) and the number of
vacancies (V ):1
Mt = f(Ut, Vt).
1Indeed, the key variable in the matching approach to modelling unemployment
dynamics is labour market ‘tightness’, which is defined as the ratio of the number of
vacancies to the number of the unemployed (V /U ).
1
Positive shocks create vacancies and cause firms to search for
workers to fill them, while adverse shocks increase unemployment and
cause workers to look for new jobs, as firms lay workers off. Matching
theory is the most commonly applied model of unemployment, and
there is certainly empirical merit in the model: phenomena such as the
Beveridge curve can be explained through this medium. In spite of this,
the model can be criticised for not providing a wholly adequate
explanation of the type of unemployment that prevails in the real
world. For example, Rogerson and Shimer (2011) argue that they, “[D]o
not see much evidence that search behavior per se is of first order
importance in understanding aggregate outcomes”, (p. 693). Moreover,
there is no role for involuntary unemployment in the model.
Nevertheless, models with search, they argue, seem promising as a
framework for understanding how aggregate labour market outcomes
are affected by different wage-setting mechanisms.
The main alternative to matching theory is the theory of efficiency
wages. The seminal work in this field is attributable to Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984). The basic idea is that firms are willing to pay a wage in
excess of the general wage if a worker’s productivity exceeds that of the
average worker. Firms wish to avoid workers leaving, since they lose
their investment if the worker is trained, and because they wish to
avoid incurring the cost of finding a suitable replacement, as is the case
in matching theory. The wage premium reduces the labour demand and
may also increase labour supply, thus generating involuntary
unemployment (particularly if we assume a fixed labour supply). In the
Shapiro-Stiglitz model, the prevailing wage premium is supposed to
detract workers from shirking, as they face a probabilistic loss if caught
shirking. Moreover, firms pay higher wage premiums at times when
2
unemployment is low, as it is easier for a worker to find a new job, and
the risk to a worker of being caught shirking is small. This extra
incentive not to shirk is required when unemployment is low, but, when
unemployment is high, firms pay a lower wage premium, as the
potential cost to a worker of being caught shirking is high, and less of
an incentive not to shirk is needed.
There are certainly criticisms that can be levied at theories of
efficiency wages, though. The main criticisms include reliance on some
strong assumptions and the implication that high-skill workers are more
likely to experience periods of unemployment than the general worker,
since more skilled workers are willing to supply labour than are
demanded at the prevailing premium wage. Specifically, in terms of the
Shapiro-Stiglitz model (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), the assumption of
homogeneous workers is a particularly strong assumption. In actual
fact, if employers have a record of a worker’s previous employment
history, as one would expect, then reputation can feasibly act as an
additional discipline device. The fact that future employers will, in all
probability, know a worker’s previous employment history, is, in effect,
a self-enforcing discipline device, insofar as it acts as a screening device
for job applicants.
Empirical work such as this thesis clearly has theoretical implications:
empirical observations can indicate whether the predictions of a certain
theoretical model are borne out in reality, and can suggest key trends
in the data that any robust theoretical model should account for. In
particular, one may wish to examine the data to see if they are consistent
with the search-and-matching approach of Pissarides (2000), or if this
approach requires refinement, in line with the rigid wages hypothesis of
Shimer (2004, 2010), for example. Moreover, one may ask whether the
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cyclical behaviour of unemployment is dictated by hires or separations.
This is a contentious issue in the field of modern macro-labour economics,
which was debated in the path-breaking work of Hall (2006) and Shimer
(2012): the ‘conventional wisdom’ that recessions are primarily driven
by high job destruction rates was brought into question.
Certain recent work in the field has even started to accept the
Shimer (2010, 2012) finding that job-separation rate is almost acyclical,
and attempted to integrate this (along with a dominant role for
unemployment duration — the job-finding rate — in determining
unemployment fluctuations) into models of the labour market and the
economy, more generally (Gertler and Trigari, 2009, for example). Some
have provided evidence against the claims of Hall and Shimer (Davis
et al., 2006, for instance), emphasising the importance of job
separations in driving unemployment, while other papers have found
significant roles for both separations and the job-finding rate (Fujita
and Ramey, 2007, and Elsby et al., 2009). The analysis of the gross
worker flow data at a time such as this (after a deep recession) is
therefore clearly a worthwhile activity that can give empirical support
to the proponents of particular models.
This thesis analyses the latest job market figures to obtain stylised
facts about gross worker flows in the UK, in light of the latest recession:
that is, gross worker flows between the three labour market states
(employment, unemployment, and inactivity). Job-to-job flows are also
examined. The study examines the magnitude and cyclical properties of
such flows, and results are compared to those presented in earlier
studies of the UK labour market by Bell and Smith (2002) and Gomes
(2009, 2012). The study utilises the two-quarter longitudinal data set
for the period 1997 Q2 — 2010 Q3, sourced from the Labour Force
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Survey, as well as the derived job-to-job flows data used by Gomes
(2012). There is also a gender comparison of the rates of employment,
unemployment, and inactivity.
This work seeks to incorporate data from the latest recession
(beginning in 2008 Q2) into the analysis, and to resultantly shed light
on the dominant macroeconomic factors driving unemployment in the
UK throughout and beyond the 2008-09 recession. This thesis looks far
more explicitly at the recent recession than does Gomes (2012), who
looks at the broader picture, over the last 13 years. It is certainly true
to say that a close examination of gross worker flows during and beyond
the recession is valuable: what happens in recessions ultimately allows
us to determine the cyclical nature of flows and hazards for moving
between labour market states. These findings give valuable insight to
theorists who attempt to create robust macroeconomic models of the
labour market. Other contributions include the use of detrended Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) as the cyclical indicator (as opposed to
another labour market indicator) and a split-sample analysis, which
flags some interesting trend changes in labour market flow movements
and transition rates, even prior to the Great Recession.
One of the salient findings of this thesis is the striking decline in job-
to-job movements during and beyond the recent recession. This striking
decline came after a period of almost a decade where such movements
had already been on a general downward trend. This has undoubtedly
indirectly contributed to the observed rise in UK unemployment. Other
key trends found include the substantial fall in the job-finding rate, the
notable rise in the job-separation rate, and the fact that men seem to
have suffered more than women as a result of the recession.
The thesis is organised as follows: chapter 1 reviews the related
5
theory; chapter 2 reviews the empirical literature; chapter 3 analyses
UK gross worker flows over the period investigated, including an
examination of changes in the rates of employment, unemployment, and
inactivity (overall and by gender), an analysis of gross flows between
states, and an investigation of the probability of flowing between states;
and the conclusion — which includes consideration of avenues of
potential future work in this area, in light of the findings laid out in the
thesis — wraps the thesis up.
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Chapter 1: Theoretical Perspectives on
Gross Worker Flows
1.1 Early Thinking on Gross Worker Flows
Before addressing the numbers, some of the theory on gross worker flows
is discussed below. This section provides a useful point of reference later
in the analysis, as it can be checked whether the data bears out the
predictions of the theoretical models. A non-exhaustive overview of some
key, elementary models is provided.
Blanchard and Diamond (1992) present a partial equilibrium model
of the flow approach to the labour market, which serves as useful
starting point. The flow approach, it is asserted, is built on three
building blocks: 1) a specification of labour demand in terms of gross
flows of job destruction, x, and job creation, y ; 2) a specification of the
hiring process through a matching function, m; and 3) a specification of
the determination of the wage, w. Their labour demand relation is
given by:
x = x(w, θx), xw ≥ 0; (1.1.1)
y = y(w, θy), yw ≤ 0, (1.1.2)
where w is the wage and θx and θy represent a vector of factors that
shift job destruction and creation respectively. This specification implies
a perfectly elastic long-run labour demand, at the wage which is such
that x = y. Stocks are not incorporated in either the creation or the
destruction equations. All flows in this model come from the process
of job creation and destruction. Hiring is determined by the constant-
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returns matching function, given by:
h = m(U, V ), mU > 0;mV > 0, (1.1.3)
where h denotes total hires, U denotes unemployment, and V is
vacancies. This implicitly assumes that only the unemployed are
engaged in job-search. The final element of the Blanchard and
Diamond model is how wages are determined. There are numerous
potential approaches, but the paper chooses the efficiency wage
approach (with wages set so as to discourage shirking).2 The wage will
depend on the probability of finding a job when unemployed, which,
under constant returns in the matching technology, is dependent only
on V /U. Therefore:
w = w(V/U), w′ > 0. (1.1.4)
Utilising equations (1.1.1) to (1.1.4), along with the two accumulation
identities for unemployment and vacancies, yields the following two
dynamic equations:
dU
dt
= x[w(V/U), θx]−m(U, V ); (1.1.5)
dV
dt
= y[w(V/U), θy]−m(U, V ). (1.1.6)
The key predictions of their model are summarised below. General
movements in aggregate activity are likely to lead to opposite shifts in job
creation and job destruction. Such movements usually mean U and V
2In fact, the Nash bargaining approach to wage-setting is probably the most
prevalent in contemporaneous research. Gertler and Trigari (2009) show that
staggered multi-period Nash wage bargaining can help to explain the volatility of
unemployment over the business cycle, within the standard Mortensen and Pissarides
(1994) matching framework.
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move in opposite directions, since increased unemployment is associated
with decreases in vacancies, and, thus, with decreases in wages. Times of
reallocation, contrarily, are likely to lead to shifts of the same sign in job
creation and destruction, meaning U and V generally move in the same
direction. In short, the model predicts the number of workers moving
from employment to non-employment (unemployment and inactivity) to
be countercyclical as jobs are destroyed, while the numbers moving from
unemployment to employment should be procyclical as job creation falls.3
Blanchard and Diamond (1990) present a model which considers
two types of workers, who differ in their attachments to the labour
market: ‘primary’ workers and ‘secondary’ workers. The former
infrequently move into and out of the labour force, indicative of their
strong labour force attachment, and have brief spells of unemployment;
the latter are more likely to drop out of the labour force, demonstrating
weak labour force attachment, and are more likely to spend long
periods in both unemployment and inactivity. In summary, secondary
workers drop out of the labour force more often, while, typically, a
primary worker who leaves employment will move into unemployment.4
In an economy with continual job creation and destruction, it is
assumed that primary workers only leave employment (E ) when laid
off; at this point they move into unemployment (U ). Put equivalently,
they do not quit. Secondary workers leave employment through both
layoffs and quits; at this time they move into inactivity (I ). Firms are
willing to accept both primary and secondary workers, but prefer hiring
a primary worker when given the choice. In equations, when subscript 1
3Non-employment is not a single labour market state: this was established as long
ago as Flinn and Heckman (1983).
4The other fundamental aspects of the model are that search behaviour between
the two groups and how workers are perceived by firms may both differ, with the latter
leading to firms preferring to hire primary workers and preferring to fire secondary
workers first.
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denotes primary workers and subscript 2 denotes secondary workers:
L1 = E1 + U ; (1.1.7)
L2 = E2 + I, (1.1.8)
where L1 and L2 are given. Jobs can take three forms: filled (F ), unfilled
with a vacancy posted (V ), or unfilled with no vacancy posted (N ). Each
job requires a single worker and the total number of jobs is given by K.
Therefore:
K = F + V +N, K given; (1.1.9)
F = E = E1 + E2. (1.1.10)
Filled jobs produce a gross (of wages) revenue of either 1 or 0, with
the 0—1 productivity for each job following a Markov process in
continuous time. Productive jobs become unproductive with flow
probability pi0, while pi1 is the flow probability that an unproductive job
becomes productive. A productive job may become unproductive and
vice versa at any point in time. This is the “black box” mechanism
deployed in order to capture the large gross flows of job creation and
job destruction that prevail in the economy. There is also the
possibility of movement between states due to quits; primary workers
are assumed not to quit, while secondary workers quit at the constant
rate, q. Not dissimilarly to the 1992 paper by the same authors, there is
an aggregate matching function, in which hires, h, are a function of the
pool of non-employed workers and of vacancies:
h = m[(U + I), V ], mU ≥ 0;mV ≥ 0. (1.1.11)
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Since, as aforementioned, it is assumed that employers rank primary
workers above secondary workers, a matching function for the primary
workers is, implicitly:
h1 = m1(U, V ), m1,U ≥ 0;m1,V ≥ 0, (1.1.12)
in which I no longer appears. Taking vacancies as given, a larger number
of inactive secondary workers does not affect the employment prospects
of unemployed primary workers. Finally, the hiring function of secondary
workers is:
h2 = h− h1. (1.1.13)
Taken together, the above equations and assumptions lead to the
following three equations of motion:
dV
dt
= −h− pi0 + pi1N + qE2; (1.1.14)
dE1
dt
= −pi0E1 + h1; (1.1.15)
dE2
dt
= −(pi0 + q)E2 + h2. (1.1.16)
If the economy is subject to an adverse cyclical shock, which leads to
an increase in the rate of job destruction, pi0, and a decrease in the rate
of job creation, pi1, the model generates a number of predictions:
1. Unemployment has a negative effect on the hires of secondary
workers. Because secondary workers are often inactive, flows from
inactivity to employment (IE ) are likely to be greater when
unemployment is low. As such, the flows are predicted to be
procyclical, in line with the later work of Pissarides (2000).
2. As layoffs increase, the flows of both types of workers out of the
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labour force increase; however, as the pool of employed secondary
workers decreases, the number of quits falls, even at a constant quit
rate. Hence, while the flow from employment to unemployment
(EU ) unambiguously increases, it is unclear whether the flow from
employment to inactivity (EI ) will increase or decrease.
3. On the hiring side, decreases in job creation and quits lead to a
decline in job vacancies. Taken together with ranking and the
increase in the pool of unemployed primary workers, this sharply
decreases the chances of secondary workers finding work. Thus,
the flow from inactivity to employment (IE ) decreases.
4. What happens to the flow from unemployment to employment
(UE ) is ambiguous, since the larger pool of unemployed may
offset the effect of fewer vacancies, and lead to an increase in the
number of hires from unemployment (an increase in the UE flow).
Movements between unemployment and inactivity (UI and IU ) are not
considered in the Blanchard and Diamond (1990) model; nevertheless,
the model has the potential to explain four of the six gross labour market
flows between distinct states.
Further, as alluded to by Bell and Smith (2002), any analysis of the
labour market is not complete without an examination of job-to-job
flows. Pissarides (1994), in his model with on-the-job search,
demonstrates that, at least in the beginning of the cycle, job-to-job
flows should be procyclical. In the model there are both ‘good’ and
‘bad’ jobs, with unemployed workers willing to accept either, while
employed workers will only accept good jobs. Employed workers only
search if they are in bad jobs. Separations other than quits are assumed
to be exogenous. If a job-seeker finds a good job, (s)he accepts it and
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stays in it until an exogenous separation process moves him (her) to
unemployment. On-the-job search predominantly occurs at short job
tenures since the accumulation of job-specific human capital ensures
that at some point, denoted by τ , the wage growth in the bad job will
offset the benefits of switching to a good job with zero tenure. As
aggregate activity increases, τ rises because there are more vacancies
and the expected search cost is reduced; however, this implies that
there are fewer workers in bad jobs at all tenures, since more workers in
bad jobs successfully find good jobs. Resultantly, employment in bad
jobs declines, although workers in them search for longer. The
implication of this is that a rise in aggregate activity will have an
ambiguous effect on the steady-state number of employed job-seekers.
Nevertheless, in the adjustment from one state to the other, the number
of employed job-seekers first rises, before later falling, implying that
job-to-job movements should be procyclical, at least in the beginning of
the cycle.
1.2 Recent Thinking: Inside the Black Box
Contemporaneous analysis of gross worker flows has most commonly been
viewed through the lens of aggregate matching models, stemming from
the seminal work of Pissarides (1985) and, at a later date, Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994). Pissarides (2000) applies the search-and-matching
approach to analyse the interaction between unemployment transitions
and macroeconomic equilibrium.
Search-and-matching models are the prevailing school of thought for
understanding unemployment dynamics. Their core features are
presented below. Given the nature of the paper, the focus is on partial
equilibrium theories of the aggregate matching function, as opposed to
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the larger-scale general equilibrium search-and-matching models, which
compute labour market equilibrium by combining the relevant
optimising behaviour by firms posting a vacancy and workers
negotiating a wage. The origins of such thinking can be traced back to
Pissarides (1985). At the most rudimentary level, there exists a
matching function at any given time, t, that can be defined as:
mtLt = mt(utLt, vtLt), (1.2.1)
where L is the labour force or labour supply (employed and unemployed
workers), u is the unemployment rate (so that uL equals the total
number of unemployed workers), v is the vacancy rate per worker in the
labour force (so that vL equals the total number of vacancies), and m is
the matching rate (so that mL is the total number of matches between
unemployed workers and firms posting a vacancy in any given time
period). The function is increasing in both arguments, so that:
mu(uL, vL) > 0 and mv(uL, vL) > 0, (1.2.2)
with the time subscript having been dropped. (This matching function
obviously disregards matches from employment — job-to-job flows —
but the model can be extended so as to allow for this possibility.)
Workers and vacant jobs can be viewed as productive inputs which
produce a match, leading to a productive job. Creation of employment
requires the presence of both unemployed workers and vacant jobs:
m(0, 0) = m(0, vL) = m(uL, 0) = 0. In the case of the function
exhibiting constant returns to scale (CRS), we can write:
m =
m(uL, vL)
L
= m(u, v). (1.2.3)
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The matching function, m(.), determines the flow of workers who find a
job and who exit unemployment within each time interval. Under CRS,
the probability that an unemployed worker finds a job is a function only
of the vacancy-unemployment ratio:
m(u, v)
u
= m(1,
v
u
) ≡ p(θ), (1.2.4)
where θ = v/u, and is referred to as labour market ‘tightness’. The
instantaneous probability, p, that a worker finds a job is positively
related to θ: an increase in θ reflects a relative abundance of vacant
jobs compared to unemployed workers, and leads to an increase in p.
The average length of an unemployment spell is given by 1/p(θ), and
is thus inversely related to θ. The rate at which a vacant job is matched
to a worker is given by:
m(u, v)
v
= m(1,
v
u
)
u
v
=
p(θ)
θ
≡ q(θ), (1.2.5)
which is a decreasing function of θ: an increase in θ reduces the
probability that a vacancy is filled. 1/q(θ) measures the average time
that elapses before a vacancy is filled. The dependence of p and q on θ
captures the dual externality between agents in the labour market: an
increase in the number of vacancies relative to unemployed workers
increases the probability that a worker finds a job (dp(.)/dv > 0), but
at the same time it reduces the probability that a vacancy is filled
(dq(.)/dv < 0).
It is often assumed, for simplicity, that matches and separations arrive
according to a Poisson process in continuous time — this is due to the
process’ features, which make it relatively straightforward to analyse.
Therefore, in terms of the equations above, p(θ) is the Poisson arrival
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rate of a match for a vacancy, and q(θ) is the Poisson arrival rate of a
match for an unemployed worker.
In the simplest form of the model, the separation rate — the flow into
unemployment from employment — is exogenously determined. Changes
in unemployment result from a difference between the flow of workers who
lose their job and become unemployed, and the flow of workers who find
a job. At each moment in time, a fraction, s, of jobs (corresponding to
a fraction, 1 − u, of the labour force) is hit by a shock that reduces the
productivity of the match to zero: in this case, the worker loses their job
and returns to the pool of unemployed, while the firm is free to open up a
vacancy in order to bring employment back to its original level. Given the
match destruction rate, s, jobs remain productive for an average period
of 1/s. There has been no shortage of papers that have endogenised the
job separation rate, with the most notable work being Mortensen and
Pissarides (1994).
Given the assumptions above, it is now possible to describe the
dynamics of unemployment. Since L is constant, d(uL)/dt = u˙L and
hence:
u˙L = s(1− u)L− p(θ)uL. (1.2.6)
Therefore:
u˙ = s(1− u)− p(θ)u. (1.2.7)
The dynamics of the unemployment rate depend on the ‘tightness’ of the
labour market, θ: at a high value of θ workers easily find a job, leading to
a large flow out of unemployment. Steady state unemployment is hence
given as:
u¯ =
s
s+ p(θ)
. (1.2.8)
Since p′(.) > 0, the properties of the matching function determine a
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negative relation between θ and u. Job creation and destruction rates
are obtained by dividing the flows into and out of employment by the
total number of employed workers, (1 − u)L. The rate of destruction is
simply equal to s, while the rate of job creation is given by p(θ)[u/(1−u)].
Each value of θ corresponds a unique value for the unemployment
rate, u. The properties of m(.) ensure that it is convex. Moreover, given
u and θ, the number of vacancies is uniquely determined by v = θu, where
v denotes the number of vacancies as a proportion of the labour force,
L. The graphical relationship between the unemployment and vacancy
rates, which is downward-sloping and convex in the u-v space, is known
as the Beveridge curve — the locus identifies the level of vacancies vi that
corresponds to the pair (θi, ui). It is important to note that variations in
the labour market ‘tightness’, θ, are associated with a movement along
the u-v curve, while changes in the separation rate, s, or the efficiency
of the matching process (captured by the properties of the matching
function) correspond to movements of the u-v curve itself.
The theory presented above constitutes the basic building blocks of
matching theory. The function can be estimated itself, or the building
blocks of this partial equilibrium set-up can also be extended to larger-
scale models that encompass search behaviour by workers seeking a job
and employers seeking to fill a vacancy. General equilibrium in search-
and-matching models is computed by incorporating optimising behaviour
by firms and workers; these search-and-matching models seek to examine
the relationship between unemployment transitions and macroeconomic
equilibrium. Obvious potential extensions that have been undertaken
include allowing for on-the-job search (Pissarides, 1994) and endogenising
the job separation rate (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994), amongst many
others.
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An abundance of literature has been produced that aims to
empirically estimate the matching function. Diamond (1982) finds that
increasing returns to scale in the matching function lead to multiple
equilibria; however, the overwhelming majority of empirical studies in
the field find the matching function exhibits CRS, which is theoretically
convenient (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 2001). Estimates of the
matching function often take — but are certainly not restricted to — a
Cobb-Douglas form — for example:
mt = M(ut, vt) = µu
α
t v
β
t , (1.2.9)
where µ is a scale parameter capturing changes in the efficiency of the
matching process that would impact on all searchers equally. CRS implies
that α+ β ≈ 1. This function is estimated by the application of a linear
or log-linear (not purely logarithmic due to the inclusion of additional
linear regressors) econometric specification.
The Cobb-Douglas functional form was previously assumed without
there being any micro-foundations to justify this choice; however,
Stevens (2007) creates a micro-founded, aggregate matching function
that can be directly integrated into standard theoretical search models.
A constant elasticity of substitution (CES) matching function, which is
approximately Cobb-Douglas when search costs are approximately
linear, is generated, with empirical estimates of matching function
parameters interpretable as the costs and benefits of search. Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001) provide a comprehensive survey of the aggregate
matching function, and the findings of a wide range of different
associated studies which make use of different matching function
specifications, finding most support for CRS specifications.
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The main predictions of matching models in the context of labour
market flows are that: job destruction rates drive unemployment in
recessions; and that flows from inactivity into both employment and
unemployment are procyclical (in line with the Blanchard and
Diamond, 1990, model). In terms of the latter, the intuition is as
follows: participation is higher when wages are higher, when the labour
market is tighter (labour market ‘tightness’ is defined as the V /U
ratio), and when the rates of job loss and interest are lower.
Resultantly, one may expect flows from inactivity into both
employment and unemployment to be procyclical, as the labour market
becomes tighter as the employment rate increases.5
1.3 A New Paradigm?
The assertion that recessions are predominantly driven by high job loss
rates had, perennially, been accepted as a stylised ‘fact’ in
macroeconomics (Pissarides, 1985; Darby et al., 1986; Blanchard and
Diamond, 1990; Pissarides, 2000). Recent papers by Hall (2006) and
Shimer (2012), however, challenged the generally accepted view that
increased separations drive recessions, with the three salient findings of
the latter being: 1) the job-separation rate is almost acyclical; 2)
separation rates contribute little to the variability of unemployment;
and 3) unemployment dynamics are, in large part, driven by a
job-finding rate that fluctuates at business cycle frequencies. Indeed,
Shimer (2012) argues that increased unemployment during recessions
arises from an increase in unemployment duration, as opposed to an
increase in the number of unemployed workers.
5This reasoning follows the intuition of Bell and Smith (2002).
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Shimer (2010) lays out the analytical argument and quantitative
evidence in detail. The book focuses on the importance of the ‘labour
wedge’ in determining unemployment dynamics over the business cycle.
The ‘labour wedge’ is the ratio of the marginal rate of substitution of
consumption for leisure (MRS) and the marginal product of labour
(MPL). Under unrealistic theoretical assumptions (the most obviously
contentious being the absence of taxes on consumption and labour), the
two would equate; however, the existence of taxes drives a ‘wedge’
between the MRS and the MPL. This ‘wedge’ is shown to be strongly
countercyclical over the business cycle: during recessions, it is shown
that workers are dissuaded from working and firms dissuaded from
hiring, due to a perceived increase in the effective labour income tax
rate. In the absence of such taxes, modifications to the basic model
that are empirically consistent with such tax increases are considered.
Examples of this include an assumption that the representative
household’s disutility of labour fluctuates at business cycle frequencies
(that is, households prefer not to work in recessions), and the
observationally-equivalent hypothesis that workers’ wage-setting power
fluctuates at business cycle frequencies (that is, recessions are periods
when households reduce their labour supply, in order to drive up
wages). These are, however, not seen as adequate nor accurate
explanations of movements in the ‘labour wedge’. Search frictions are
also shown to exacerbate inconsistencies between the competitive
search-and-matching model and the data. It is argued, though, that
real wage rigidities (the rigid wages hypothesis, discussed above),
coupled with search frictions, can help help to reconcile the model and
the data, as they create an endogenous cyclical ‘wedge’ between the
MRS and the MPL.
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In corroboration, Hall (2006) and Shimer (2012) have brought the
question of whether hires or separations drive unemployment in
recessions to the forefront of the research agenda. Shimer postulates
that the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) approach does not explain
the observed cyclical volatility of its key variable, the V /U ratio (that
is, labour market ‘tightness’). With according alterations being made to
the methodology, the putative, sustained increase in layoffs at the start
of a downturn is shown not to be borne out by the evidence; in actual
fact, recessions are shown to be characterised by a short-lived, sharp
rise in employment to unemployment flows, and a large, prolonged
decline in unemployment to employment flows, which is the
predominant driver of unemployment dynamics over the course of the
business cycle (Rogerson and Shimer, 2011). Work in this field has
subsequently gone down two distinct and separate roads: models that
incorporate the ideas of Hall and Shimer, and those that provide
evidence against their claims. It is generally agreed that extensions to
the canonical model are required, however, in order to reconcile the
model with observed labour market dynamics.
1.4 Extensions to the Canonical Model
Particularly as a result of the path-breaking work of Hall (2006) and
Shimer (2012), there has been a plethora of papers produced that have
extended the canonical matching model. Such papers include those that
consider general interactions with the economy as a whole, in full-scale
general equilibrium models of the economy. This section discusses some
interesting extensions to the basic model that have been calibrated, in
order to assess whether they provide a better understanding of the
cyclical behaviour of aggregate unemployment.
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A paper that takes approach of Shimer is Blanchard and Gal´ı (2010).
In a model with constant job destruction rates, rigid wages are shown
to generate inefficient and volatile fluctuations in unemployment.6 On a
related note, Hall (2009) finds that the cyclicality of the ‘labour wedge’
is eliminated in a model where wages are rigid but hours are efficiently
bargained over.
Rigid wages are also incorporated into the Blanchard and Gal´ı
(2007) model via the real wage being backward-looking, with the
current wage being a weighted average of the previous period’s wage
and the MRS. This change, as opposed to wages being perfectly
flexible, is shown to both amplify and propagate shocks to the
economy.7 Gertler and Trigari (2009) go one step further than
Blanchard and Gal´ı. They modify the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994)
model of unemployment dynamics to allow for staggered, multi-period
wage contracting. This approach appeals to the proponents of the
Shimer (2004, 2010) model, since it suggests that wage stickiness helps
to explain the relatively volatile behaviour of unemployment over the
business cycle. They assume that workers and firms negotiate only
periodically, bargaining so as to satisfy the Nash solution, and fixing
the wage until the next opportunity to renegotiate arises. Critically, the
negotiated wage applies not only to the firm’s existing workers, but also
to any new workers it might hire. As a result, firms that last negotiated
their wage prior to an adverse productivity shock will have little
incentive to recruit new workers following said shock. It is once more
6Whether job destruction should be endogenous or exogenous is also debated in the
associated job-search literature, as an assumption of a constant, exogenous separation
rate is tantamount to Shimer’s finding that the job separation rate is close to being
acyclical.
7Shimer (2010) calculates the current real wage as a weighted average of the
previous wage and the current wage that would prevail if there were Nash bargaining.
This, again, significantly propagates shocks, without impacting upon the comovement
of wages and labour productivity.
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shown that this amplifies the effect of shocks on the labour market,
with little consequence for overall macroeconomic equilibrium.
Pissarides (2009) acknowledges that the search-and-matching
model’s inability to explain the observed volatility of unemployment
over the business cycle is a shortcoming to be addressed, but he does
not believe wage stickiness is necessarily the answer to the
“unemployment volatility puzzle”. Rather, in a model with endogenous
job creation and destruction, Pissarides (2009) concludes that the
solution to the puzzle must be one that preserves the wage elasticities
implied by the canonical model, citing the introduction of fixed job
creation and negotiating costs, asymmetric information about
idiosyncratic shocks, on-the-job search, and non-uniform productivity
shocks as potential explanations. Indeed, Krause and Lubik (2010)
build on the on-the-job search model by Pissarides (1994), discussed
above, and conclude that on-the-job search and job-to-job transitions
greatly amplify shocks to the economy.
Given the disparate predictions of the models of Pissarides (2000) and
Shimer (2010), the latest recession provides crucial data on the dynamics
of unemployment, enabling the economist to address the issue of which
model best fits the UK labour market.
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Chapter 2: Previous Empirical Evidence on
Gross Worker Flows
2.1 UK Evidence
2.1a Gross Worker Flows in the UK
This subsection briefly reviews the empirical literature on gross worker
flows. The focus is mainly on literature that specifically examines the
UK labour market. Having used LFS data for the period 1993 to 2001,
Bell and Smith (2002) found that, for the UK:
1. Flows from employment to unemployment are countercyclical,
while the reverse flow (from unemployment to employment) is
also countercyclical.
2. Flows from employment to inactivity tend to be procyclical, while
flows from unemployment to inactivity appear to be
countercyclical.
3. Flows from inactivity are imprecisely measured, so one can have
little confidence when making any statement on their cyclical
characteristics.
4. Job-to-job flows are strongly procyclical.
In relation to the final point, those engaged in search are, intuitively,
more likely to make a job-to-job transition than those who are not
(Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1994; Bell and Smith, 2002; Gomes, 2012).
Importantly, however, it has also been suggested that certain types of
individuals are more likely to make such job-to-job transitions. More
specifically, job characteristics are crucial determinants of the likelihood
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of an individual moving between jobs. Pissarides and Wadsworth
(1994) show that workers with long job tenures are much less likely to
move between jobs because these individuals have less to gain from
search, due to the acquisition of firm-specific capital.8 It is also shown
that younger people are more likely to be engaged in search, and that
search — and in particular employed search — is a more attractive
option for skilled as opposed to unskilled workers.
In a more recent paper, Gomes (2012) finds broadly similar results
to those in Bell and Smith (2002) when using an extended data set,
running from 1996 to 2010. Most of the aggregate flows are found to be
stable within the sample, meaning the Bell and Smith conclusions
remain valid. Gomes demonstrates that flows from inactivity to
unemployment are strongly countercyclical, supporting the findings of
Bell and Smith, who however lacked conviction on this result.
Nevertheless, certain results differ and a number of new findings are
stated. For example, the cyclical behaviour of the flows between
inactivity and employment are shown to have changed since 2001: Bell
and Smith demonstrate that the flows were not related to the business
cycle before 2001, but Gomes’ analysis suggests that these flows have
since become procyclical. Furthermore, Gomes suggests a potentially
important extension to the analysis of gross worker flows: the analysis
of flows within education groups. The share of the highly educated is
increasing and, at the same time, the labour market opportunities of
different education groups are diverging: less-educated individuals are
shown to face unemployment and inactivity rates three times greater
than for those with higher education. Furthermore, the less-educated
face a job-separation rate double that of the highly-educated, and a
8This finding is consistent with the model presented in Pissarides (1994).
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job-finding rate that is half of the value for the highly-educated. This is
consistent with the Blanchard and Diamond (1990) model of ‘primary’
and ‘secondary’ workers, with the highly-educated representing the
‘primary’ workers.
In another contemporaneous examination of the UK economy, Gregg
and Wadsworth (2010) examine data on gross worker flows and other key
macroeconomic indicators, in light of the latest recession. The impact of
the recession is shown to have been much less severe than was perhaps
expected in terms of the impact on the UK labour market. Despite a fall
in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of over 6% — a drop, in fact, that
was both longer and deeper than in the previous two recessions — the
loss of employment was much smaller. The UK, it is noted, is in a small
group of countries that have witnessed small drops in the employment
rate, in spite of not having a deliberate government-funded strategy of
short hours working. The substantial decline in UK GDP coupled with a
relatively minor worsening of the labour market situation has been coined
the “productivity puzzle”. The puzzle has yet to be adequately explained,
but some early evidence suggests that weak productivity figures in the
years following the Great Recession are likely to be “persistent effects”
from the financial crisis, rather than temporary, cyclical factors which
will dissipate as the economy recovers (Bank of England, 2014).
Typically, one may expect hours of work to fall in a recession. This
is shown to indeed be the case in the most recent recession, while the
observed rise in part-time working is consistent with this finding; this
decline in hours worked is not unique to this recession, though. In fact,
hours worked fell by less in this recession, while the last two recessions
show similar or sharper rises in the share of part-time work.
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What, then, has led to the better-than-expected performance of the
UK employment rate? Gregg and Wadsworth (2010) convincingly argue
that this may be attributable to labour hoarding. Where possible, firms
may seek to keep hold of their workforce through a recession, instead
taking a short-term hit on profitability, as the loss of staff knowledge,
particularly if it will be needed again in the near future, is costly. The
gap between consumer wage growth and that faced by producers, induced
by the substantial increase in real consumer wages and the decline in
real wage growth to firms, is cited as a factor that is likely to have
enabled firms to hoard labour during the recession. Higher profitability
pre-recession and good profitability performance since may have helped,
too. Firms cannot continue to hoard labour, however, without economic
growth.
Gregg and Wadsworth (2010) also show that the rise in the
unemployment rate in this recession has been small relative to the fall
in GDP. Unemployment rate dynamics in the latest recession were
characterised by a sharp rise, which preceded an early — even before
the recession’s end — stabilisation. Employment outflows are shown to
be lower than in past recessions, while the outflow from unemployment
into employment remained higher in this instance than in past
downturns. Flows into inactivity, meanwhile, have been falling or stable
in recent years, while outflows from inactivity into unemployment have
risen. On the other hand, outflows from inactivity into employment are
as low in this recession as in previous ones. From this, it is deduced
that, “Unemployment in this recession has been driven by a
combination of lower rates of job loss and slightly higher return rates to
work than in past recessions”, (Gregg and Wadsworth, 2010, p. 12).
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Other related issues noted include: long-term unemployment is on
the rise, although it is still much lower than the levels seen in past
recessions; unemployment levels amongst less-educated young people in
this recession were well above those of previous recessions; and the
situation for older workers is much better than in previous contractions.
The youth unemployment rate, in this recession, is found to be nearer
three times that of prime-age adults, rather than double as in the past.
Gregg and Wadsworth therefore suggest a further dimension to the
Gomes (2012) assertion that less-educated workers face adversarial
labour market conditions: it is ostensibly the less-educated young that
suffer most.
Furthermore, a rise in the inactivity rate, albeit modest, is reported
by Gregg and Wadsworth (2010). On the basis of past experience this
rate may be expected to increase later in the cycle, though, since
inactivity usually rises in a UK recession, although it typically lags
behind movement in the unemployment rate by around one year. In a
further observation, the authors note the increase in the number of
young people staying on in both further and higher education. Such
rates have risen in past recessions and the latest downturn has also seen
a considerable rise. Indeed, inactivity rates discarding full-time
students have been on a gradual decline since the 1990s recession.
Using this logic, the authors show that the small rise in inactivity
observed in this recession has, so far, been mainly down to increased
participation in education.
Finally, it has previously been found that job-to-job changes account
for most of labour turnover in the UK (Pissarides and Wadsworth, 1994).
On a related note, Mumford and Smith (1999) show that flows between
jobs is the largest of the three potential flows into employment (from
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unemployment, inactivity, and job-to-job), when using Australian labour
market data. This is supported by Nagypa´l (2008), who shows that not
only are job-to-job flows a pervasive feature of the US labour market,
but that they are also essential to understanding worker turnover over
the business cycle. Clearly, it would be remiss of any author to exclude
job-to-job flows from their analysis.
2.1b Hazard Rates: Intuition and UK Evidence
It is imperative to note the distinction between gross flows and hazard
rates. The simplest interpretation of a hazard rate is that it represents
the probability of moving from one state to another (conditional on
having been in the previous state between t0 and t). In contrast, the
flow simply gives the number of people moving between states.
Crucially, for the same flow movement, the gross flows and hazard rates
may diverge in terms of cyclicality. For example, one may expect the
hazard rate for moving between unemployment and employment (UE )
to fall in a recession (procyclical), although the incidence of such flows
may increase due to an increase in the stock of unemployed
(countercyclical). Intuitively, one may expect the hazard for the reverse
move, from employment to unemployment (EU ), to be countercyclical,
although whether or not there is a wave of separations at the start of a
recession is clearly a source of much contention, as demonstrated above.
The evidence presented in Bell and Smith (2002) and Gomes (2012)
suggests that the EU hazard is countercyclical in the UK.
Initially, it is unclear whether the unemployment-to-inactivity (UI )
hazard or the inactivity-to-unemployment (IU ) hazard will follow a
particular pattern. There are likely to be countervailing forces pushing
the UI hazard up and down simultaneously. More unemployed workers
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may become ‘discouraged’ during a recession and move into inactivity,
increasing the hazard rate and hence making it countercyclical, though
this effect may be offset if the pool of unemployed has increased. Both
Bell and Smith (2002) and Gomes (2012) find a significantly procyclical
hazard rate, implying that the probability of making a UI transition
decreases in a recession. The cyclical pattern of the IU hazard is also
theoretically and intuitively ambiguous. Nevertheless, both papers find
a strongly countercyclical hazard.9 The implications of the four results
presented above are well summarised by Gomes (2012): [R]ecessions are
periods when it is harder for an unemployed individual to find a job, an
employed person is more likely to lose their job and an inactive person
is more likely to start looking for one”, (p. 10).
Why inactive people are more likely to begin job-search in a recession
is unclear, given the facts and intuition imply it is more difficult to find a
job in such times. This, too, seems counterintuitive since the opportunity
cost of leisure is lower during a recession.10 Although it is harder to
find work, the fact that the labour market becomes looser (a rise in the
number of flows between the three labour market states) in a recession
may encourage individuals to start looking for work.
There are three more transition probabilities to consider: namely,
employment-to-inactivity (EI ), inactivity-to-employment (IE ), and
job-to-job (JJ ). Once more, intuition struggles to predict the cyclical
behaviour of the first two hazards. Bell and Smith (2002) find the EI
hazard to be weakly countercyclical. Contrarily, Gomes (2012) finds the
hazard to be weakly procyclical over the whole sample, not related to
9Again, Bell and Smith (2002) suggest readers err on the side of caution when
interpreting their hazard rates out of inactivity — just as readers are encouraged to
be cautious when interpreting flows out of inactivity — due to imprecise measurement
and a lack of confidence on any statement of their cyclical characteristics.
10As explained by the Intertemporal Substitution Hypothesis.
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the business cycle in the first sub-sample, and significantly procyclical
in the second sub-sample. Of the IE hazard: Bell and Smith find it to
be insignificantly procyclical, whereas Gomes finds the hazard to be
insignificantly (and more weakly) procyclical over the full sample,
unrelated to the business cycle in the first sub-sample, and significantly
(albeit relatively weakly) procyclical in the second sub-sample. To
complete the analysis, it is reasonable to conjecture that the JJ hazard
will be procyclical, which is indeed evidenced by both papers.
2.2 International Evidence
Much of the literature in the field has focused on the US labour market.
Although UK and US labour markets differ in terms of structure and
frictions, it is important to still summarise some of the associated
literature and their key findings. There is also some discussion of
findings for other European and OECD labour markets in the survey
below. Hall (2006) and Shimer (2012) are the main empirical studies
that promote the rigid wages hypothesis, with subsequent work that
accepted their findings attempting to build theoretical models of the
labour market that went further towards reconciling the canonical
model (with search frictions and rigid wages) and the claims of Hall and
Shimer; most of the subsequent empirical literature provides evidence
against their claims, though.
Davis et al. (2006) use new US micro-data sources to demonstrate
that whether the job-loss or job-finding rate plays a dominant role in
changes in unemployment depends heavily upon the severity of the
employment downturn: the job-loss rate is shown to dominate in severe
downturns. Elsby et al. (2009), meanwhile, find that there is a
significant role for both hires and separations in explaining US
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unemployment dynamics, by merely applying a slight refinement to the
theoretical approach of Shimer (2012), even when using the same data.
This paper improves on the data correction methods of Shimer, whose
methodology accounts for the effects of survey redesign and
time-aggregation in the US Current Population Survey (CPS). Firstly,
the authors generate a more stable corrected series for the problematic
short-term unemployment series in the CPS. Secondly, they correct for
time-aggregation bias by imputing weekly discrete-time hazard rates for
the unemployment inflow. This improves on Shimer’s continuous-time
methodology, as it is consistent with the discrete weekly nature of the
CPS labour force definitions. Similarly, Fujita and Ramey (2007) find
that neither the job-finding rate nor the job-separation rate can, per se,
account for all of the aggregate fluctuations in US unemployment;
again, a role for both factors is found.
Haefke et al. (2013) show that the wage of newly-hired workers,
unlike the aggregate wage, is volatile, responding to one-to-one to
changes in labour productivity: that is, wages in new matches are
flexible, but wages in existing matches are not. This form of wage
rigidity is shown to not affect job creation, and so it cannot explain the
“unemployment volatility puzzle”. Pissarides (2009) finds the same
when testing, via microeconometric methods, a model with fixed
matching costs that allows wage flexibility in new matches. Rogerson
and Shimer (2011) argue that this finding is not inconsistent with the
rigid wages hypothesis, though, as the observation that wages are as
volatile as labour productivity is shown to be uninformative about
whether wages are rigid.
Elsby et al. (2013) use publicly-available data on unemployment by
duration spell to estimate the job-finding and separation rates for
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OECD countries. Building on the methodology of Shimer (2012), the
authors use data on unemployment by duration of spell. For the US
(and indeed the UK), they find that the calculated job-finding rate is
quite different depending on which unemployment length was used,
which can be interpreted as evidence of duration dependence (a
well-known empirical fact of course being that the probability of
moving from unemployment to employment depends on the duration of
the unemployment spell). This demonstrates the importance of the
job-finding rate in recessions: as the stock of unemployed increases,
average duration is likely to increase, which will impact on the
unemployment rate in the medium-term as those experiencing longer
unemployment spells struggle to find employment.
Blanchard and Portugal (2001) also found an analogous result, but
with job flows in a comparison of US and Portuguese labour markets.
They find that, at a quarterly frequency, job creation and job
destruction in Portugal are substantially lower than in the US, although
the unemployment rate is roughly the same in the two nations. The two
labour markets differ considerably in terms of frictions, in that there is
more employment protection in Portugal. This reduces the
job-separation rate, but, on the other hand, unemployment duration is
longer, which impacts unemployment dynamics through a lower
job-finding rate. The two forces push against once another, thus having
an ambiguous impact on the unemployment rate.
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2008) assess the relative importance of
unemployment inflows and outflows in the France and Spain (as well as
the UK). In a similar finding to that of Blanchard and Portugal (2001),
labour market frictions are shown to impact on unemployment inflows
and outflows (and thus which dominates and drives unemployment
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dynamics in that particular country). In France, the dynamics of
unemployment are driven almost entirely by the outflow rate — this is
consistent with a regime that has strong labour market institutions and
strict employment protection legislation (this is similar to the case of
Portugal, discussed in the previous paragraph). Both rates are shown
to contribute significantly to aggregate unemployment dynamics in
Spain, and this is attributed to the high incidence of fixed-term
contracts since the late 1980s. In the UK, the inflow rate became a
bigger contributor after the labour market reforms of the mid-1980s,
although its significance was shown to have subsided again in the late
1990s and 2000s.
Finally, the finding in subsection 2.1a that, in the UK, more inactive
people beginning to search for a job during a recession is also found in
the US labour market (S¸ahin et al., 2010). These authors suggest that
this finding may be attributable to the failure of men — who perhaps
had been prompted to rejoin the labour force by a decline in household
liquidity — to find a job upon re-entry. Alternatively, this may be
explained by the Pissarides (1994) model of on-the-job search, which
implies that hires from unemployment are, in effect, ‘crowded out’ by
hires from employment (job-to-job transitions) during expansions.
The usefulness of Labour Force Survey (LFS) data for the purpose
of analysing how UK data fits with the models discussed in chapter 1
was previously hindered considerably because the sample did not include
relevant data for a significant economic downturn; now it does, rendering
this a most appropriate time to analyse gross flows and unemployment
dynamics in the UK labour market.
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Chapter 3: An Empirical Application: The
UK Case
3.1 Modelling Labour Market Dynamics
Before discussing the findings, it is first important to outline some
notation used and discuss some of the fundamental equations describing
labour market dynamics and the movement between states. There are
three labour market states: employment (E ), unemployment (U ), and
inactivity (I ). These sum to give the working-age population, W :
W ≡ E + U + I. (3.1.1)
The labour force, L, is a subset of the working-age population, made up
of the economically active (those either in employment or those actively
seeking it):
L ≡ E + U. (3.1.2)
The unemployment rate, u, is defined as the number of unemployed as a
proportion of the labour force:
u ≡ U
L
. (3.1.3)
Furthermore, the participation rate, p, is defined as the labour force as
a proportion of the working-age population:
p ≡ L
W
. (3.1.4)
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Total employment evolves according to the following equation:
Et+1 = Et +H
UE
t +H
IE
t − SEUt − SEIt , (3.1.5)
where H represents the gross hiring flow (from U or I ), S the gross
separations flow (from E ), and the superscript indicates the flow
movement from state A (A=E, U, I ) to state B (B=E, U, I ), with
A 6= B: for example, UE represents the flow from unemployment to
employment. In words, total employment at the end of period t equals
the number in employment at the start of period t, plus those entering
E from either U or I, minus those exiting E to either U or I.11
During period t, one can denote InAt as the number of people who
flow into state A (A=E, U, I ) and OutAt as the outflow out of state A.
This allows us to define a simple intertemporal constraint for each labour
market state, similar to those presented by Bell and Smith (2002):
Et+1 = Et + In
E
t −OutEt ; (3.1.6)
Ut+1 = Ut + In
U
t −OutUt ; (3.1.7)
It+1 = It + In
I
t −OutIt . (3.1.8)
Equation (3.1.6) is a simplification of (3.1.5) and, similarly, (3.1.7) and
(3.1.8) are simplifications of equations (3.1.12) and (3.1.16), respectively.
This constitutes the gross flow approach to the analysis of labour markets,
focused on by, for example, Blanchard and Diamond (1990). It is possible
to focus on the total gross flows as the determinant of changes in the
employment rate. Deducting Et from both sides of equation (3.1.5) and
11This equation implicitly assumes a steady state population: that is, Lt+1 = Lt =
L.
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normalising by the total working-age population gives:
Et+1 − Et
Wt
=
HUEt
Wt
+
HIEt
Wt
− S
EU
t
Wt
− S
EI
t
Wt
. (3.1.9)
Alternatively, one may wish to think of the flows in terms of hazard
rates, as advocated by Shimer (2010, 2012). If this is the case, (3.1.9) may
be written in terms of hiring rates, h, and separation rates, s, by again
deducting Et from both sides of (3.1.5), before this time normalising by
Et:
Et+1 − Et
Et
= hUEt + h
IE
t − sEUt − sEIt . (3.1.10)
Equivalently, (3.1.9) can be written in terms of transition probabilities,
with λCE denoting the hiring probability from pool C (C =U, I ), and
γEC similarly denoting the separation probability to pool C :
Et+1 − Et
Et
= λUEt
ut
1− ut + λ
IE
t
1− pt
pt(1− ut) − γ
EU
t − γEIt . (3.1.11)
Similar decompositions are available for the changes in unemployment
and inactivity. Unemployment evolves according to the following
equation:
Ut+1 = Ut + S
EU
t + Y
IU
t −HUEt − Y UIt , (3.1.12)
where Y represents movements between U and I. Again, it is possible to
focus on either gross flows or hazard rates. In gross flow terms, we have:
Ut+1 − Ut
Wt
=
SEUt
Wt
+
Y IUt
Wt
− H
UE
t
Wt
− Y
UI
t
Wt
. (3.1.13)
Meanwhile, in hazard rate terms, one can write:
Ut+1 − Ut
Ut
= sEUt
Et
Lt
Lt
Ut
− fUEt +
Y IUt − Y UIt
Lt
Lt
Ut
, (3.1.14)
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where f is the job-finding rate. Equivalently:
Ut+1 − Ut
Ut
= γEUt
1− ut
ut
+ ψIUt
1− pt
ptut
− λUEt − ψUIt , (3.1.15)
where ψ denotes the probability of making the transition between U and
I indicated by the superscript. Lastly, inactivity evolves according to:
It+1 = It + S
EI
t + Y
UI
t −HIEt − Y IUt . (3.1.16)
Once more, the economist can focus on gross flows, as in equation
(3.1.17), or hazard rates, as in equations (3.1.18) and (3.1.19):
It+1 − It
Wt
=
SEIt
Wt
+
Y UIt
Wt
− H
IE
t
Wt
− Y
IU
t
Wt
; (3.1.17)
It+1 − It
It
= sEIt
Et
Lt
Lt
It
− f IEt +
Y UIt − Y IUt
Lt
Lt
It
; (3.1.18)
It+1 − It
It
= γEIt
(1− ut)pt
1− pt + ψ
UI
t
utpt
1− pt − λ
IE
t − ψIUt . (3.1.19)
Transition rates from state A (A=E, U, I ) to B (B=E, U, I ) can then
be calculated as:
λABt+1 = − ln(1−
ABt
At
), (3.1.20)
where, again, A 6= B.
Referring back to the canonical model, discussed above, it was
shown that in a two-state world, where there is no labour force growth,
continuous time steady state unemployment is given by:
ut =
st
st + ft
, (3.1.21)
where, once more, st and ft are the (instantaneous) unemployment inflow
and outflow rates, respectively. In a three-state world, the continuous
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time stocks (pools) of the three labour market states evolve as follows:
E˙t = λ
UE
t Ut + λ
IE
t It − (λEUt + λEIt )Et; (3.1.22)
U˙t = λ
EU
t Et + λ
IU
t It − (λUEt + λUIt )Ut; (3.1.23)
I˙t = λ
UI
t Ut + λ
EI
t Et − (λIUt + λIEt )It, (3.1.24)
where λt denotes the (instantaneous) transition rate at time t and the
superscripts denote the relevant movement between states.
In this set-up, there is no allowance for movements between jobs. It
will later be shown that such movements are of considerable importance,
and should, in future, be factored into simple equations that explain the
evolution of labour market stocks — as well as in any robust theoretical
model of labour market dynamics.
A final comment on notation is required. The ‘→’ symbol is used to
denote total movements into or out of a particular labour market state.
For example, E→ denotes total employment outflows (to U and I ), while
→E is used for total employment inflows (from U and I ). The ‘→’ is
absent for flows between labour market states; for example, EI denotes
flows from employment to inactivity, while the converse, IE, is used for
the opposite flow (from inactivity to employment). JJ denotes job-to-job
flows.
3.2 The Data
The study utilises the two-quarter longitudinal data set for the period
1997 Q2 — 2010 Q3, sourced from the LFS, and the job-to-job flows
series of Gomes (2012), which was derived from the same source. Office
for National Statistics (ONS) census population weights are applied to
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the constructed series, implying that non-response bias is compensated
for, and estimates produced are interpretable for the population. Non-
response occurs if an individual does not take part in the survey. This
may take two forms: after taking part in the survey in earlier periods,
individuals may not be contactable in later periods (non-contact), or an
individual may refuse to participate (refusal). For the LFS, the rate of
the former is around 5%, while the rate of the latter is between 10%
and 15% (Gomes, 2012). The weighting procedure accounts for the fact
that non-response is more likely to be associated with certain individual
characteristics.
A further complication that is more difficult to deal with is that of
response error bias. This occurs when respondents provide incorrect
information (knowingly or unknowingly) about their current status. In
longitudinal data this is certainly a more serious problem. Recent
empirical evidence, as summarised in the Economic and Social Data
Service (ESDS) user guide for two- and five-quarter longitudinal data
sets, suggests that response error is likely to affect longitudinal data
sets, most probably in the direction of an upward bias in estimates of
gross flows between different broad economic activity categories.12 This
is consistent with theory, which suggests flows will be overestimated, as
errors are cumulative. The guide also makes some (tentative)
suggestions about particular transitions that are likely to be affected.
Included in this list are UI flows. The fact that such flows will, in all
likelihood, suffer from upward bias, is something we should particularly
bear in mind. There is apparently no practical way to deal with
response error bias, however. Nonetheless, Gomes (2012) argues there is
no a priori reason to believe that response error bias will affect the
12Available at: http://www.esds.ac.uk/doc/6459/mrdoc/pdf/lfs longitudinal.pdf.
Retrieved on 2nd February, 2011.
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cyclical properties of the gross flows.
Each series is seasonally adjusted. They are likely to exhibit distinct
seasonal patterns (such as a large increase in the flow into employment
at the end of the academic year) and the data need to be adjusted to
account for these observed patterns. Therefore, the standard X12
seasonal adjustment is applied to each series. This is standard practice,
although we are assuming that no prior adjustments to the data, before
seasonally-adjusting, are required, so as to account for, say, trend
breaks, seasonal breaks, or outliers. In order for a clearer pattern to
emerge when the adjusted gross flows data are graphed, a four-quarter
moving average is applied, which removes the rather pronounced, high
frequency movements in the data. Doing this removes white noise
seasonal components and allows for interactions between the business
cycle and seasonality (Blanchard and Diamond, 1990).
No correction for potential time-aggregation bias has been applied
to the data, given the focus of this thesis: as the thesis focuses on the
cyclical nature of labour market flows and hazards, no adjustment has
been made in this respect. Such adjustments are necessary for analyses
that attempt to determine the relative importance of unemployment
inflows and outflows in determining the dynamic behaviour of aggregate
unemployment. As discussed below, though, such an analysis is not
undertaken in this thesis, as the focus here is on the cyclical nature of
flows and hazards over the entire sample, and two shorter sub-samples,
in the mould of Bell and Smith (2002). This focus is as opposed to the
thesis making an attempt to decompose unemployment rate dynamics
in the UK, attaching relative weights to the importance of
unemployment inflows and outflows respectively, as this has been done
over a similar period by Gomes (2012). While slight downward bias
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with an appropriate cyclical indicator may be induced by the exclusion
of some flows that actually occurred, there is no a priori reason to think
that making a time-aggregation adjustment will affect the cyclical
properties of labour market flows data: that is, there is no reason to
believe, in the UK, that the size of these excluded flows is sufficiently
large to impact the cyclical properties of the flow movement under
which they are classified.
3.3 UK Gross Worker Flows: 1997 Q2 — 2010 Q3
3.3a Average Gross Flows
Figure 1 summarises the average quarterly worker flows from 1997 Q2
to 2010 Q3. Reported are the number of people, k, in thousands, who
changed status, the average stocks and flows, p, as a percentage of the
working-age population, and the hazard rate, h, for moving between
states (that is, the probability of transitioning from one state to
another, having been in the previous state during the previous time
period). In this instance, as the Figure presents average stocks and
flows since 1997 Q2, the used data are not seasonally-adjusted. It
should also be noted that, in order to concentrate on worker flows
between different labour market states, new entries and exits from the
working-age population have been excluded from the analysis,
consistent with Bell and Smith (2002) and Gomes (2012). The latter
argues that this is reasonable since only a minority of young people
enter the labour force directly when they come of age (16 years old),
and, similarly, more than half of the people reaching retirement age (65
for men and 60 for women at the time this analysis was undertaken) are
already inactive.
The data reveal that over the time period investigated there was,
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on average, a 73,000 net increase in employment, a 15,000 net decrease
in unemployment, and a 58,000 net decrease in inactivity each quarter.
The most important point to note here is that substantial quarterly gross
flows lie behind the net values. While, for example, there was a 73,000 net
quarterly increase in employment, this masks an average move of 870,000
people out of employment each quarter (with approximately 58% going
into inactivity), while an average of 943,000 people move into employment
(with an almost 50:50 split from unemployment and inactivity). Between
the official start of the recession (in 2008 Q2) and 2010 Q1, there was a net
decrease of 304,000 in the level of employment (a net decrease of 38,000
people per quarter). Meanwhile, net unemployment increased by 696,000
(a rise of 87,000 people per quarter) and net inactivity has fallen by
392,000 (a quarterly drop of 49,000 people). 2010 Q2 and 2010 Q3 figures
show signs of recovery, though: the employment pool grew by 577,000,
the unemployment pool fell by 11,000, and the inactivity pool fell by
566,000 (with around 46% of inactivity leavers entering employment).
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Figure 1. Average Quarterly Working-Age Population Worker Flows:
UK, 1997 Q2 — 2010 Q3
Sources: LFS and author analysis
Notes: Working-age population is defined as men aged 16-64 and women aged
16-59. Worker flows are expressed as a total number of people in thousands (k), as
a percentage of the working-age population (p), and as a hazard rate (h). Average
quarterly job-to-job flows are indicated by the arrow out of and back into the
employment pool.
Since the data set runs from 1997 Q2 to 2010 Q3, and the data used by
Gomes (2012) for his comparable analysis runs over a similar period (1996
Q2 — 2010 Q4), the results presented here are similar to those presented
by him. Resultantly, the discussion is kept brief, as the main focus of
this work is the examination of gross flows since the 2008-09 recession. A
noteworthy difference between Figure 1 and a similar analysis presented
in Bell and Smith (2002) is the larger stock of unemployed found in
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their study. The strong growth of the UK economy from 2001 until the
recession is likely to account for most of observed drop in the stock of
the unemployed. The stock values in Figure 1 sum to a higher total
than those presented by Bell and Smith, as expected, given the observed
growth of the working-age population over time.
3.3b The Evolution of Labour Market Stocks, Flows, and
Hazards
In this subsection the evolution of the employment, unemployment, and
inactivity rates, the evolution of the outflows from each state (broken
down into outflows into the other two remaining states, as a percentage
of the working-age population), and the evolution of the hazard rate
(transition probability) for exiting a particular state (again broken down
into rates for moving into the two remaining states) are examined, over
the investigated period. It is imperative to note that this sample includes
data from the latest recession, and thus overcomes one major limitation
of LFS data: the fact that many data were only available from 1996
onwards, and the period 1996 — 2008 constituted a long-lived expansion.
Vertical lines are used to indicate the recessionary period (2008 Q2 —
2009 Q4), as per the Bank of England definition.
In terms of the employment rate, we have seen a pronounced and
continual drop of around 2.40 percentage points (a proportional drop of
around 3.20%) since the official start of the recession in 2008 Q2 (refer
to Figure 2). The period before the recession was characterised by an
increasing rate until around 2001, before the rate eventually stabilised,
ostensibly around its steady-state value. It is also important to note that
the drop was sudden, and the downward trend in the employment rate
continued until 2010 Q2. There was no observed improvement in the
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performance of this indicator up until this date; and the increase at this
date was indeed infinitesimal.
Figure 2. Evolution of the Employment Rate: UK, 1997 Q2 — 2010 Q3
Sources: LFS and author analysis
What has driven this decline in employment? Figure 3 shows how
outflows from employment have evolved over time. EI flows appear to
have fallen by 0.20 percentage points since the onset of recession (a
proportional drop of around 15%); however, the drop in E outflows
from this particular source has been more than offset by the increase in
EU flows. From peak-to-trough, this flow movement increased by
approximately 0.43 percentage points through the recession (a
proportional rise of in excess of 30%). Although in recent quarters there
appears to have been a drop in such flows, one can already state that
employment outflows to unemployment appear to have played a
significant role in driving UK unemployment through the recession.
The evidence on employment outflow hazard rates (see Figure 4)
further corroborates this argument. A negligible drop in the EI hazard
and a considerable rise in the EU hazard are found — results that are
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not dissimilar to those found in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Evolution of Employment Outflows: UK, 1997 Q2 — 2010 Q3
Sources: LFS and author analysis
What about outflows from unemployment? Since the official start
of the recession, the UK unemployment rate has increased by over 2.50
percentage points (see Figure 5). This constitutes a rise of almost 50%.
The rate followed a path of gradual decline from the start of the sample, in
1997, again levelling off around 2001. The rate then remained relatively
stable until the recession.
Figure 6 demonstrates how UE and UI flows gradually fell from the
start of the sample up until around 2002, which, of course, is consistent
with the observed fall in the unemployment rate. Both rates have risen
since the recession began (by around 15% and 35%, respectively). The
UE increase has been relatively small and was not instantaneous, while
the UI increase has been more sizeable and immediate. A caveat is
required here, though: as noted in section 3.2, the longitudinal nature of
the data may bias this flow upwards.
The UE hazard rate, meanwhile, has fallen dramatically (refer to
49
Figure 4. Evolution of Employment Outflow Hazard Rates: UK, 1997
Q2 — 2010 Q3
Sources: LFS and author analysis
Figure 7). The hazard was following a general pattern of increase until
the mid-2000s when it took a considerable drop. This was followed by a
brief recovery until the onset of recession, in 2008 Q2. Peak-to-trough,
it fell by around 8.50 percentage points, a proportional fall of close to
30%. The UI hazard rate has fluctuated slightly over the sample, yet
still broadly remained between 17% and 20%. The rate has fallen to
below 17% since the recession started, though — falling by circa 2.50
percentage points (a 15% drop). The Figure seems to suggest the UI
hazard has begun following a general upward trend, although it is too
early to tell if this trend will continue.
The economic inactivity rate has tended to gradually fall (with some
fluctuation) over the sample. Figure 8 shows that the recessionary period
has seen the first noteworthy rise of about 0.45 percentage points in the
rate of inactivity since the early 2000s (a proportional rise of about 2%).
This rise was, however, not immediate.
We can see from Figure 9 that IE flows were, on average, trending
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Figure 5. Evolution of the Unemployment Rate: UK, 1997 Q2 — 2010
Q3
Sources: LFS and author analysis
Figure 6. Evolution of Unemployment Outflows: UK, 1997 Q2 — 2010
Q3
Sources: LFS and author analysis
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Figure 7. Evolution of Unemployment Outflow Hazard Rates: UK, 1997
Q2 — 2010 Q3
Sources: LFS and author analysis
Figure 8. Evolution of the Inactivity Rate: UK, 1997 Q2 — 2010 Q3
Sources: LFS and author analysis
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upwards in spite of certain downward fluctuations; again, until recession
struck, when such flows markedly decreased. These flows, in fact, fell by
0.35 percentage points (around a quarter of the pre-recession level) from
peak-to-trough after the recession, although they have started trending
upwards again in recent quarters; this, perhaps, when coupled with the
recent decline in EU flows, could be seen as being indicative of some sort
of recovery. On the other hand, IU flows have been on the rise since
2002. Before that date, this flow had been trending downwards. The rise
in IU flows became more pronounced around 2006, and has remained
pronounced since the official beginning of the recession, rising by roughly
0.25 percentage points (a rise of almost a quarter). In the meantime,
the respective hazard rates have, too, followed divergent patterns (see
Figure 10). Since the recession, the IE hazard has fallen by around one
fifth of its pre-recession level (again, despite a slight recovery in recent
quarters), while the IU hazard, which has risen consistently since 2002,
has increased by around one fifth. These patterns are, once more, almost
identical to those seen in Figure 9.
To sum up, since the onset of recession (in 2008 Q2): the
employment rate has fallen, the unemployment rate has risen, and the
inactivity rate has (belatedly) also risen. The results further show that
EU flows and hazards have increased markedly, implying they are
strongly countercyclical. EI flows have fallen by a small amount and
the hazard has fallen negligibly, so there is no clear cyclical pattern
implied as yet. UE flows are on the rise (countercyclical), although the
hazard rate is falling rapidly (procyclical). Similarly, UI flows have
risen (countercyclical), with the hazard rate going in the opposite
direction (procyclical). Finally, IE flows and hazards have fallen
markedly (both procyclical), while IU flows and hazards have increased
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Figure 9. Evolution of Inactivity Outflows: UK, 1997 Q2 — 2010 Q3
Sources: LFS and author analysis
Figure 10. Evolution of Inactivity Outflow Hazard Rates: UK, 1997 Q2
— 2010 Q3
Sources: LFS and author analysis
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rapidly (both countercyclical), although this upward trend began before
the recession. These findings are reconciled with the theory and
previous empirical evidence in section 3.6.
3.3c Employment, Unemployment, and Inactivity Rates by
Gender
A further important question is whether there have been differential
effects of the recession on the labour market outcomes of men and
women. Given the increasing participation rates of women in the UK
labour market (and the increasingly prominent role they have to play),
it is interesting to ask whether or not the 2008-09 recession has curbed
this. It is also interesting to see the effects on the male participation
rate — which has been moving in the opposite direction to that of
women — as a result of the recent recession. Further, examination of
the male unemployment rate is also of interest, since it would not be
unreasonable to conjecture that young, uneducated males are likely to
be disproportionately affected by the recession, given their
comparatively poor labour market outcomes in periods of economic
growth.
Figures 11, 12, and 13 show the rates of employment,
unemployment, and inactivity for both men and women.13. It is
immediately apparent that, given the pre-recession levels of
employment and unemployment, men have fared markedly worse than
women during the recession: the male employment rate fell by around
3.5 percentage points (a proportional fall of around 4.5%), while that
for women fell by just over 1 percentage point (a proportional fall of
roughly 1.5%); and the male unemployment rate increased by 3.3
13Data, in this instance, are sourced from the ONS
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percentage points (an approximate 60% rise), compared to an increase
of 2 percentage points for women (an approximate 40% rise).
Why might this be the case? S¸ahin et al. (2010) observe a similar
pattern in the US, and conjecture that this is because certain
male-dominated industries (manufacturing, for example) were affected
disproportionately by the recession. One may tentatively suggest that
an analogous argument holds for the UK. It may also be argued that
women are more likely to have their hours of work varied over the
business cycle. A far higher proportion of women work part-time than
do males (indeed, the OECD rate of female part-time working is high —
far higher than that for males). It is possible that the effect on women
has not been as severe as that for males, as women are more likely to
accept a reduction in working hours from full-time to part-time, or to
fewer part-time hours. It is in the firm’s interests to cut costs by cutting
working hours, rather than getting rid of workers (labour hoarding),
especially if the worker is trained, as it means the firm does not lose its
training investment. This also means the firm can avoid future hiring
and training costs for new workers, when the economic environment
improves. Many women work to supplement the income primary
earner, who is typically male. As males tend to be the primary earners,
they are less likely, and usually less able, to accept a reduction in
working hours, if offered. Women, meanwhile, are more likely to work
in industries where a reduction in working hours is more feasible; this
may not always be a possibility in certain male-dominated industries.
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Figure 11. Evolution of the Employment Rate by Gender: UK, 1997 Q2
— 2010 Q3
Sources: ONS and author analysis
Figure 12. Evolution of the Unemployment Rate by Gender: UK, 1997
Q2 — 2010 Q3
Sources: ONS and author analysis
With regard to the inactivity rates, the rate for men has been
following a gradual, general upward trend over the sample period, with
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an upward spike of around half a percentage point occurring in late
2009; while the rate for women has been on a downward trend over the
sample. This confirms two patterns that are well-established in the
existing literature: the increasing prevalence of economic inactivity
amongst working-age males, and the increasing labour force
participation rates of working-age women.
Figure 13. Evolution of the Inactivity Rate by Gender: UK, 1997 Q2 —
2010 Q3
Sources: ONS and author analysis
3.3d Job-to-Job Flows
As aforementioned, analysis of the labour market is incomplete without
the examination of job-to-job flows. Figure 14 shows how such flows
appear to have been on a downward trend roughly between 2001 and
2006. Job-to-job flows then began to increase again, before a sharp
decline associated with the recession. Somewhat counterintuitively, the
share of employed persons searching for a job, which was on a
downward trend until 2006, appears to have risen since the recession
58
(see Figure 15). The rate began to rise again in 2006, before falling
back slightly, and eventually beginning to rise in early 2009 (and then
onwards). This is in spite of the lower probability of being able to make
a JJ transition.
Figure 14. Job-to-Job Flows as a Share of the Working-Age Population:
UK, 1997 Q2 — 2010 Q3
Sources: LFS, Gomes (2012) data set for job-to-job flows, and author analysis
One would expect persons who are actively searching for a job to be
more likely to find one than those who are not engaged in job-search.
This is indeed shown in Figures 16 and 17. These figures also show
that the chance of making a JJ transition has fallen strikingly since the
recession, both if an individual is actively searching and if they are not.
Both have fallen by just short of 40% since the recession officially began
(Figure 14).
The fall in JJ flows appears to have been a prominent factor in
driving UK unemployment. Figure 18 graphs the breakdown of the
hiring rate (accessions into E from U and I, plus JJ transitions). The
graph shows how the hiring rate from U has risen by just over 0.20
percentage points since the beginning of the recession (a proportional
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change of around 17%), while the hiring rate from I has fallen by
approximately 0.25 percentage points (a proportional change of just less
than 20%); however, these changes have been modest when compared
to the absolute fall in the hiring rate from E (JJ flows). The rate has
fallen by around 0.80 percentage points, a proportional drop of
approximately 37%. It may also be noted from Figures 14, 16, 17, and
18 that that there was a downturn in job-to-job movements between
2005 and 2007. The fact that there was a slowdown of the GDP growth
rate in a number of quarters between these dates may go toward
explaining this observation.
Figure 15. Share of Employed Searching for a Different Job: UK, 1997
Q2 — 2010 Q3
Sources: LFS, Gomes (2012) data set for job-to-job flows, and author analysis
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Figure 16. Job-to-Job Hazard if Looking for a Different Job: UK, 1997
Q2 — 2010 Q3
Sources: LFS, Gomes (2012) data set for job-to-job flows, and author analysis
Figure 17. Job-to-Job Hazard if not Looking for a Different Job: UK,
1997 Q2 — 2010 Q3
Sources: LFS, Gomes (2012) data set for job-to-job flows, and author analysis
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Figure 18. Breakdown of the Hiring Rate: UK, 1997 Q2 — 2010 Q3
Sources: LFS, Gomes (2012) data set for job-to-job flows, and author analysis
3.4 What has Driven UK Unemployment Through
the Recession?
Figures 19 and 20 map the evolution of the hiring and job-separation
rates, respectively. The aim is to investigate whether either factor has
played a dominant role in driving unemployment dynamics throughout
the recession. The hiring rate had trended downwards from the start of
the sample up until around 2006, before making a substantial and speedy
recovery. This recovery continued until the recession. Since then it has
fallen by about 0.90 percentage points, a proportional drop of around
19%. In the meantime, the job-separation rate rose dramatically at the
start of the recession, although recent quarters have seen the rate start to
recover. From peak-to-trough, the rate increased by circa 0.35 percentage
points, a proportional rise of around 16%.
In order to investigate whether the reduction in JJ transitions can
account for most of the witnessed fall in the hiring rate, Figure 21
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Figure 19. Evolution of the Job-Finding Rate: UK, 1997 Q2 — 2010 Q3
Sources: LFS, Gomes (2012) data set for job-to-job flows, and author analysis
Figure 20. Evolution of the Job-Separation Rate: UK, 1997 Q2 — 2010
Q3
Sources: LFS, Gomes (2012) data set for job-to-job flows, and author analysis
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graphs the hiring rate, excluding JJ transitions (which is here defined
as the job-finding rate). A drop over the recessionary period of in the
region of 0.30 percentage points (a proportional fall of approximately
11%) implies that the observed reduction in the UE and IE flows also
play a significant role in explaining the observed cyclical behaviour of
UK unemployment, although the observed decline in JJ flows appears
to have been the dominant factor in driving the decrease in the hiring
rate.
The above analysis is somewhat intuitive, but the figures reveal that
both the job-separation rate and the job-finding rate (and indeed the
hiring rate) have had at least some role to play in the observed rise in
UK unemployment since the recession: it is certainly reasonable to
conjecture that the UK’s job-separation rate is not acyclical. This is
examined further below, although this thesis does not, by using the
different decomposition methods proposed in the literature, attach
relative weights to the importance of the job-finding and job-separation
rates for UK unemployment fluctuations: this has already been done
over a similar sample period for the UK by Gomes (2012), using the
decompositions of Fujita and Ramey (2009) and Shimer (2012).
Moreover, Smith (2011) proposes a new (non-log) decomposition of
unemployment dynamics that does not require unemployment to be in
steady state at all times, and uses this to analyse British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS) data from 1988 to 2008; this is also discussed
below.14
Gomes (2012) corrects the data for the possibility of multiple
transitions between interview periods. An example of this would be a
14This is particularly useful for analysing UK data, since the unemployment rate is
likely to deviate more noticeably from steady state when inflow and outflow transition
rates are not particularly high. This is true of the UK, especially when compared to
the US.
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Figure 21. Evolution of the Job-Finding Rate (Hiring Rate Less Job-to-
Job Transitions): UK, 1997 Q2 — 2010 Q3
Sources: LFS and author analysis
worker making an EU transition, followed by an UE transition,
between interview periods — the worker would be recorded as having
been continually employed, having been employed at the two interview
points, and neither of the two transition would be recorded in the data.
This is a problem referred to as time-aggregation bias, and is likely to
induce downward bias in the correlation of the job-finding rate with an
appropriate cyclical indicator. In theory, time-aggregation bias should
be more of a problem in the UK than the US, as surveys are quarterly,
rather than monthly. Still, such adjustments to the data are most
relevant to the application of decomposition methods that attempt to
attach relative weights to the unemployment inflow and outflow rates
respectively, rather than in the examination of the cyclical nature of the
flows (as is undertaken in this thesis). While slight downward biased
may be induced, there is no a priori reason to believe the cyclical
properties of flows will be affected by such a data adjustment.
Therefore, adjustment in this respect is made to the data in this thesis.
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Gomes (2012) uses the continuous-time correction method of Shimer
(2012) to account for this. He finds that both the job-finding rate and
the job-separation rate have an important role to play in explaining
unemployment fluctuations in the UK, when applying both the
unemployment decomposition methods of Fujita and Ramey (2009) and
Shimer (2012). In a two-state decomposition (inactivity is ignored), the
job-separation rate is shown to be a marginally more important
determinant of fluctuations in unemployment than the job-finding rate.
In a three-state decomposition (including inactivity), once flows into
and out of inactivity have been discarded, the split is 60:40 in favour of
the job-finding rate. The results hold for both decomposition methods,
and imply that both the job-finding rate and job-separation rate are
important in determining unemployment fluctuations over the business
cycle in the UK. This is consistent with Petrongolo and Pissarides
(2008).
The results also hold when Gomes (2009) applies what the author
argues to be an improvement on the Shimer (2012) time-aggregation
correction method: the application of the Elsby et al. (2009) discrete-
time correction method. This method is more aligned with the discrete
nature of CPS (and LFS) definitions and ignores movements out of and
back into a particular state, within one week. It would, for example,
be nonsensical to count someone as being unemployed, if they left one
job at the end of a particular working day, before starting a new job
the next morning. On the contrary, the continuous-time method would
class every point in time between leaving a job and starting a new one
as a spell of unemployment. As such, Shimer’s method is likely to over-
correct for time-aggregation bias. Gomes’ results when applying this
methodology demonstrate that, although the job-finding rate has been
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more important than the job-separation rate over the last decade (despite
both still being important), the job-separation rate has played a key
role during significant downturns. The same can be said of this latest
recession.
Finally, the examination of BHPS data carried out by Smith (2011)
demonstrates that the job-separation rate drives UK unemployment
through recessions, while it is driven by the job-finding rate through
periods of moderation. It should however be noted that this paper
cannot account for the fall-out effects of the latest UK recession, as the
data set only runs up to 2008.
3.5 Cyclical Properties of UK Gross Worker Flows
The cyclicality of flows can be defined as their correlation with the level
of economic activity. This subsection examines the cyclicality of gross
worker flows to explore whether the findings are consistent with the
theory and the previous evidence. Two approaches are applied:
correlating the flows and hazards with the business cycle (GDP); and a
simple, linear regression approach that aims to identify if flows and
hazards have a statistically significant effect on the unemployment rate.
Firstly, correlation coefficients between each of the
seasonally-adjusted series (flows and hazards) and the natural
logarithm of detrended GDP (the cyclical indicator) are examined. The
author favours the use of these correlation coefficients for the analysis
of the cyclical properties of labour market flows and hazards for four
reasons: GDP — as opposed to another labour market indicator — is
used as the indicator of the business cycle; it is more robust to detrend
GDP than it is to model the negative structural trend in the
unemployment rate over the sample with a simple time trend (as is
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done in the regression approach, discussed below); the approach further
simplifies an already basic regression approach to assessing the cyclical
properties of labour market flows and hazards; and this approach is not
undertaken in papers of a similar scope to this thesis, thus allowing for
a unique contribution in this area. The GDP data are detrended using
a Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, with a smoothing parameter, λ, of
1,000,000 (106). Although it is standard to use a λ of 1600 for quarterly
data, a smaller smoothing parameter causes the filter to track the
original data much more closely than a considerably larger smoothing
parameter. Using such a large smoothing parameter is close to linear
detrending. The application of a HP filter with a smoothing parameter
that is too low will not allow the data to fluctuate around its trend
enough (it tracks the original series too closely), and, resultantly,
pronounced deviations from trend are more likely to exhibit high
degrees of correlation.15 This is why such a large smoothing parameter
has been used here.
The data are split into a 27-quarter sub-sample and a 26-quarter
sub-sample for robustness purposes and to allow for specific focus on
the recessionary period: 1997:Q2 to 2003:Q4 and 2004:Q1 to 2010:Q2.16
Table 1.a presents the results for the whole sample, Table 1.b for the
first sub-sample results (1997:Q2 to 2003:Q4), and Table 1.c for those
from the second sub-sample, which includes the recessionary period
15Given that a certain series, zt, which in our case, here, is GDP, can be split into
two components (trend, µt, and cycle, ct), so that zt = µt + ct, the HP filter solves
minµt
∑
T
t=1
[
(zt − µt)2 + λ(∆2µt+1)2
]
where ∆2 indicates the second-difference. A
large smoothing parameter, λ, attaches a heavy weight (penalisation) to the second
term in the equation and penalises the growth rate in the trend component much
more heavily than the cyclical component.
16Note that one observation has been lost due to the filtering of the data.
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(2004:Q1 to 2010:Q2).17 As detrended GDP is used as an indicator of
the business cycle, a positive coefficient implies that a particular flow or
hazard is procyclical, while a negative coefficient means that it is
countercyclical. Splitting the sample into two, when analysing the
simple bivariate correlation coefficients between detrended GDP and
the seasonally-adjusted flows and hazards, contributes to the existing
literature on worker gross flows by allowing more explicit analysis of the
cyclical nature of the series in recent quarters, including the recession
period and beyond. The recession is important for revealing the cyclical
properties of the series in the UK — especially since it has been such a
long time since the last UK recession (a time when detailed data on
gross worker flows were not available). This exercise, coupled with the
above results, allows us to determine the cyclical properties of UK gross
worker flows, and what drives UK unemployment in the aftermath of a
severe recession; these were the very questions that motivated the
thesis.
17The second sub-sample has been chosen deliberately to include a sustained period
(of economic growth) before the recession. The cyclical nature of the flows and
hazards at this time are likely to be influenced heavily by the recessionary period.
The inclusion of a sustained period prior to the recession allows us to place the
findings in the context of the past seven years, rather than merely looking at the
cyclical properties of the flows during the recession and in the brief period beyond
(the results of which will be entirely predictable). The results should also be relatively
robust to any trend changes in particular flows or hazards, as the period examined
when the sample split (27 and 26 quarters) is relatively short compared to the whole
sample (53 quarters).
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Transition Correlation Coefficient of Log
Detrended GDP With:
Average Size of
Quarterly
Gross Worker
Flow as a
Percentage of
Working-Age
Population
Gross Flow Hazard Rate
E → U -0.52** -0.57** 0.99
E → I 0.44** 0.24* 1.38
U → E -0.49** 0.61** 1.25
U → I -0.58** 0.48** 0.83
I → E 0.34* 0.53** 1.32
I → U -0.47** -0.51** 1.05
Job-to-Job 0.48** 0.35* 2.77†
Job-to-Job (S ) 0.42** 0.44** 0.86†
Job-to-Job (NS ) 0.50** 0.38** 1.85†
→ E -0.01 0.61** 2.57
E → -0.28* -0.29* 2.37
→ U -0.64** -0.59** 2.04
U → -0.62** 0.58** 0.83
→ I -0.26* 0.42** 2.21
I → -0.11 -0.17 2.37
Table 1.a. Cyclical Properties of Labour Market Flows and Hazards —
Correlation Coefficients Between Labour Market Flows and Hazards and
Log Detrended GDP: UK, 1997 Q2 — 2010 Q2
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Transition Correlation Coefficient of Log
Detrended GDP With:
Average Size of
Quarterly
Gross Worker
Flow as a
Percentage of
Working-Age
Population
Gross Flow Hazard Rate
E → U -0.43** -0.62** 0.98
E → I 0.19 0.04 1.42
U → E -0.56** 0.54** 1.29
U → I -0.60** 0.33* 0.81
I → E 0.15 0.19 1.33
I → U -0.45** -0.47** 0.98
Job-to-Job -0.11 -0.15 3.06†
Job-to-Job (S ) -0.21 -0.02 0.96†
Job-to-Job (NS ) 0.02 0.09 2.06†
→ E -0.22 0.53** 2.62
E → -0.16 -0.39* 2.39
→ U -0.61** -0.58** 1.96
U → -0.67** 0.52** 0.81
→ I -0.21 0.32* 2.22
I → -0.13 -0.19 2.31
Table 1.b. Cyclical Properties of Labour Market Flows and Hazards —
Correlation Coefficients Between Labour Market Flows and Hazards and
Log Detrended GDP: UK, 1997 Q2 — 2003 Q4
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Transition Correlation Coefficient of Log
Detrended GDP With:
Average Size of
Quarterly
Gross Worker
Flow as a
Percentage of
Working-Age
Population
Gross Flow Hazard Rate
E → U -0.55** -0.60** 1.00
E → I 0.46** 0.33* 1.35
U → E -0.47** 0.62** 1.22
U → I -0.66** 0.50** 0.86
I → E 0.52** 0.61** 1.31
I → U -0.62** -0.64** 1.12
Job-to-Job 0.62** 0.59** 2.49†
Job-to-Job (S ) 0.57** 0.61** 0.76†
Job-to-Job (NS ) 0.69** 0.67** 1.66†
→ E -0.08 0.62** 2.52
E → -0.19 -0.22 2.35
→ U -0.67** -0.71** 2.12
U → -0.65** 0.67** 0.86
→ I -0.31* 0.52** 2.21
I → -0.14 0.01 2.43
Table 1.c. Cyclical Properties of Labour Market Flows and Hazards —
Correlation Coefficients Between Labour Market Flows and Hazards and
Log Detrended GDP: UK, 2004 Q1 — 2010 Q2
Sources: LFS, Gomes (2012) data set for job-to-job flows, and author analysis
Notes: The average sizes of the gross flows are calculated from the raw
(seasonally-unadjusted) data. One observation has been lost due to the filtering of
the data.
† Job-to-Job flows are expressed as a percentage of total employment
S = Searching; NS = Not Searching
** = Statistically significant from zero at the 1% level; * = Statistically significant
from zero at the 5% level
The findings shown by Tables 1.a, 1.b, and 1.c are, in the main,
consistent with those found in Bell and Smith (2002) and Gomes (2009,
2012). Inflows to and outflows from all pools are countercyclical in the
main (although acyclical in some cases), with U inflows and outflows
being particularly strongly countercyclical. There are more movements
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between the three pools during a recession, as the labour market becomes
looser. The findings confirm the conclusion of Gomes (2012), which states
that most of the action occurs in the unemployment pool: more inactive
people start searching for jobs (indicated by a countercyclical IU flow),
and more workers lose their jobs (countercyclical EU flow). At the same
time, more unemployed people stop searching (countercyclical UI flow)
and more unemployed workers find jobs (countercyclical UE flow) by
virtue of the fact that the pool of unemployed is larger, and more people
are out of work and are searching for work (although, statistically, it
is more difficult to find work, as indicated by a procyclical UE hazard
rate). Also, EI and IE flows are procyclical (particularly so over the
whole sample and the second sub-sample). The correlation coefficients
tend to be stronger when the sample is split (particularly in the second
sub-sample).
In terms of hazard rates, over the whole sample period, the EU
hazard is strongly countercyclical, and the EI hazard is (less strongly)
procyclical. The UE, UI, and IE hazards are all fairly strongly
procyclical, while the IU hazard is countercyclical. Therefore, the
recent recession appears to have been a time when a worker was more
likely to become unemployed and was less likely to become inactive. It
was also a time when an unemployed person was less likely to find work
or become inactive. Inactive people are less likely to become employed
and are more likely to start looking for work. Most coefficients on the
respective hazards are stronger when the sample is split into the two
sub-samples (particularly in the second sub-sample): that is, the
cyclical pattern is more pronounced.
The correlation coefficients for the flows and hazards in the second
sub-sample — as shown in Table 1.c — are clearly larger in terms of
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absolute magnitude, and hence generally exhibit a higher degree of
cyclicality. This could perhaps be attributable to the 2008-09 recession.
Comparable analysis by Bell and Smith (2002) does not incorporate
data from any significant downturn, while Gomes (2012) focuses on the
broader picture, rather than more narrowly on the recession, as is done
here. One could speculate that the onset of recession has shown up
strong underlying cyclical patterns that gross flows actually exhibit;
perhaps the true extent of such patterns do not show up in expansions.
For example, the three sets of JJ flows and hazards appear procyclical
over the whole sample, while the flows and hazards are either
countercyclical or exhibit little or no cyclical component in the first
sub-sample, but are strongly procyclical in the second. While this may
be surprising, the findings are consistent with those presented in
Figures 14, 16, 17, and 18, which imply that JJ flows had been falling
throughout the 2000s (pre-recession). This implies that job-to-job flows
have started to develop a greater degree of cyclicality in recent years,
and this pattern has been emphasised by the recession. This finding
expands on the comparable results those of Gomes (2009, 2012):
job-to-job flows and hazards are procyclical over the whole sample (as
Gomes finds), but the flows and hazards pertaining to job-to-job flows
depict a much higher degree of (pro)cyclicality during the second
sub-sample (that is, 2004 Q1 — 2010 Q2).
Also, the EI hazard rate appears acyclical in the first sub-sample,
yet procyclical in the second, while the IE flow appears far more
strongly procyclical in the second sub-sample than the first. The above
results remain broadly unchanged when the (seasonally-adjusted)
unemployment rate is used as the cyclical indicator (see the appendix),
although, when this measure is used, the absolute magnitude of the
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correlation coefficients tend to be larger, and there are also more
statistically significant correlation coefficients (most likely due to the
endogeneity of the indicator).
Secondly, the logarithm of each series is regressed on a constant
term, seasonal quarter dummies, a linear time trend, and the
seasonally-unadjusted percentage unemployment rate, using Ordinary
Least Squares (OLS). This is the same approach used by Baker (1992)
to assess the cyclical properties of unemployment duration. The cyclical
component is defined by the coefficient on the seasonally-unadjusted
unemployment rate. The results of this approach are shown in Table 2.
As the unemployment rate is used as an indicator of the business cycle
in both cases, a positive coefficient implies that a particular flow or
hazard is countercyclical, while a negative coefficient means that it is
procyclical.
Table 2 shows the findings of running a similar OLS regression to
that of Baker (1992), in order to examine the cyclical properties of the
respective flows and hazards. The findings largely support those in Tables
1.a, 1.b, and 1.c. There are two notable differences, though: here, there
is shown to be a cyclical component to transition probabilities between
employment and inactivity, and the job-finding rate appears to be a
more important contributor to fluctuations in the unemployment rate
than does the job-separation rate. With inspection of 1.c, one can see
that the EI and the IE transition probabilities became fairly strongly
procyclical (particularly the IE hazard) during the second sub-sample.
This meant that these hazards were procyclical over the whole sample
(see Table 1.a), and is likely to explain why significant coefficients on the
hazards are found in Table 2, as well.
With regard to the relative importance of the job-finding rate and
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the job-separation rate, while both hazards are statistically significant,
the absolute coefficient on the finding rate is three times that of the
separation rate in Table 2. Judging by the findings, it would appear
that the job-finding rate is somewhat more important in determining
unemployment dynamics in the UK (by a ratio of 75:25), although a
more careful analysis would be required, in order to fully justify this
statement.
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Transition Gross Flow Hazard Rate
Average Size of
Quarterly
Gross Worker
Flow as a
Percentage of
Working-Age
Population
E → U 0.093** (8.32) 0.103** (9.39) 0.99
E → I -0.038** (-4.22) -0.027** (-2.96) 1.38
U → E 0.063** (7.21) -0.096** (-10.3) 1.25
U → I 0.107** (13.4) -0.052** (-6.72) 0.83
I → E -0.065** (-7.11) -0.065** (-6.97) 1.32
I → U 0.082** (10.70) 0.082** (10.3) 1.06
Job-to-Job -0.083** (-7.70) -0.072** (-6.79) 2.77†
Job-to-Job (S ) -0.069** (-5.30) -0.074** (-6.65) 0.86†
Job-to-Job
(NS )
-0.099**
(-10.20)
-0.072**(-7.66) 1.85†
→ E -0.001 (-0.15) -0.090** (-10.8) 2.57
E → 0.018* (2.47) 0.030** (3.94) 2.37
→ U 0.087** (14.5) 0.087** (13.6) 2.05
U → 0.081** (12.8) -0.078** (-11.6) 2.09
→ I 0.019** (2.98) -0.050** (-6.95) 2.21
I → 0.004 (0.55) 0.004 (0.60) 2.37
Table 2. Cyclical Properties of Labour Market Flows and Hazards —
Baker-Type OLS Regression Coefficients and t-statistics: UK, 1997 Q2
— 2010 Q3
Sources: LFS, Gomes (2012) data set for job-to-job flows, and author analysis
Notes: The cyclicality of the series is defined as the coefficient on the unemployment
rate, in an OLS regression of the logarithm of the series in question on a constant
term, seasonal quarter dummies, a linear time trend, and the seasonally-unadjusted
(%) unemployment rate (t-statistics are in parentheses). The average sizes of the
gross flows are calculated from the raw (seasonally-unadjusted) data. The results are
robust to the removal of the linear time trend. Also, it makes little-to-no difference if
the seasonally-adjusted or seasonally-unadjusted (%) unemployment rate is used.
† Job-to-Job flows are expressed as a percentage of total employment
S= Searching; NS = Not Searching
** = Statistically significant from zero at the 1% level; * = Statistically significant
from zero at the 5% level
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3.6 Reconciling the Findings with the Theory and
Previous Evidence
Are these findings consistent with the theory and (or) previous
empirical evidence? In terms of explaining unemployment dynamics,
the findings presented suggest that both the job-finding and the
job-separation rate play a crucial role in determining the cyclical
behaviour of UK unemployment. This finding is consistent with Bell
and Smith (2002) and Gomes (2009, 2012), who find that both are
important determinants of unemployment fluctuations in the UK.
Gomes (2009, 2012) carries out a rigorous analysis of the relative
importance attached to each factor, and finds both play important roles
in the determination of UK unemployment movements, with the largest
ratio in favour of the job-finding rate being 60:40. It also supports the
findings of Elsby et al. (2009), who state that both the job-finding rate
and the job-separation rate are important in explaining unemployment
fluctuations in the US. Contrary to Blanchard and Diamond (1990),
Davis and Haltiwanger (1992), and Pissarides (2000), there is no
dominant role found for the job-separation rate in explaining UK
unemployment dynamics. Similarly, in contrast to Hall (2006) and
Shimer (2010, 2012), there is no dominant role found for the job-finding
rate, either. Both flows appear to behave in a volatile manner. Davis
et al. (2006) find that changes in the job-separation rate explain most
of the variation in unemployment during sharp recessions, whereas
fluctuations in the job-finding rate dominate during milder economic
downturns — a reasonable argument, given the findings above,
accompanied with those of Gomes (2009, 2012).
The finding that IE flows are procyclical, whereas UE flows are
countercyclical, is consistent with the Blanchard and Diamond (1990)
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model of ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ workers. Moreover, the
countercyclical nature of EU flows and the procyclical nature of EI
flows that are observed are consistent with those found in the
comparable analysis of Gomes (2009, 2012), and are also consistent
with figures reported in Blanchard and Diamond (1990). IU flows are
found to be countercyclical, which supports the findings of Bell and
Smith (2002), as well as Gomes (2009, 2012), but does not bear out the
predictions of the Pissarides (2000) model. JJ flows and hazards are
found to be procyclical over the sample. This is consistent with the
equivalent results presented by Gomes (2009, 2012), although the
degree of correlation found is considerably lower than those stated by
Bell and Smith. This finding is consistent with the decline of JJ flows
through the 2000s, discussed above. In recent times, however, it
appears that job-to-job flows and hazards have started to exhibit a
larger degree of (pro)cyclicality, as they did in the 1993 — 2000 period,
as evidenced by Bell and Smith. The correlation coefficients on the
three flows and hazards pertaining to job-to-job flows in Table 1.c are
closer to those presented by Bell and Smith than those presented by
Gomes (2009) and those in Tables 1.a and 1.b, above. In terms of
absolute magnitude, the correlation coefficients on the flows in Table
1.c are close to matching the coefficient on job-to-job flows in the Bell
and Smith paper, while the correlation coefficients on the hazards in
Table 1.c exceed that on the job-to-job hazard in Bell and Smith.
Furthermore, the finding that IU flows have increased since the
onset of recession, as has the share of those in employment who are
searching for a new job (implying more people have started searching
for a job in the recession, and job-search is thus countercyclical), seems
counterintuitive. This may be attributable to the loosening of the
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labour market, which may encourage people to start looking for a new
job.18 This observation is also consistent with the Pissarides (1994)
model of on-the-job search. The argument is that firms open relatively
more jobs that are suitable for employed job-seekers, making it more
difficult for unemployed job-seekers to get such jobs. Hires from
unemployment are, in effect, ‘crowded out’ by hires from employment
(job-to-job transitions) during expansions: “The changes in the
composition of job vacancies and the congestion caused by employed
job-seekers are especially acute immediately following an improvement
in economic conditions”, (Pissarides, 1994, p. 473). Alternatively, since
IU flows appear to have been trending upwards before the recession,
this may be indicative of a targeted government policy (Labour’s New
Deal) to get inactive people back into the labour force.
The fact that the share of those who are employed and searching is
increasing may be down to the number of employed persons searching
(ES) remaining relatively stable, while the number of employed persons
(E ) fell. Alternatively, E may be falling at a faster rate than ES. The
share of employed persons searching is given by:
Share of Employed Searching = E
S
E
.
If the denominator falls while the numerator remains fixed, or if the
denominator falls at a faster rate than the numerator, then the left-hand
side (the share of employed persons searching) will increase.
Meanwhile, inflows into inactivity appear to be on the rise, although
no obvious pattern has yet appeared. This is consistent with the assertion
by Gregg and Wadsworth (2010) that inactivity usually increases in a
18Even though it is statistically more difficult to find a job, individuals may be
encouraged to start job-search by the perceived increase in gross labour market flows.
Expansions are periods when, although jobs become easier to find, as the labour
market is tighter, there are fewer movements between labour market states.
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UK recession, although it tends to lag behind the unemployment rate by
around a year. The rise in the male inactivity rate, for instance, rose
by about half of a percentage point at the end of 2009, a year after the
recession’s official start.
In terms of gender, the observed gradual fall in the female inactivity
rate, and the gradual rise in the male inactivity rate, over the sample,
bear out already familiar patterns found in the literature on the labour
force participation rates of men and women. The finding that the recent
recession has had a more detrimental impact on men than women (with
the male employment rate falling by more than the female rate, and
the male unemployment rate rising by more than the female rate) is
consistent with intuition and with results found in Gregg and Wadsworth
(2010) and S¸ahin et al. (2010). Many women work part-time, and it may
be expected that women are more likely to accept a reduction in working
hours than men. Women are also more likely to work in industries where
a reduction in working hours is more feasible: this may not always be a
possibility in certain male-dominated industries. Gregg and Wadsworth
observed an increase in part-time working during the 2008-09 recession.
Most of the people taking up the offer of part-time work are likely to be
women. It should also be noted, however, that the increase in part-time
working was of a lesser order than in previous recessions (particularly the
recession of the late 1980s, when short-time working was subsidised by
the government). The authors state that firm profitability was greater
prior to this recession than previous ones. This, coupled with the fact
that there was, this time around, no government subsidy for short-time
working, has probably meant the rise in the incidence of part-time work
in this recession was not as high as in previous recessions. Nevertheless,
the rise will have saved a considerable number of jobs; the majority of
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which are likely to have belonged to women.
Furthermore, S¸ahin et al. (2010) give a two-fold argument as to why
male unemployment has increased more than women’s in the US: 1)
male-dominated industries have been hit hardest by the recession; and
2) previously inactive men, perhaps prompted by a decline in household
liquidity, have rejoined the labour force, but failed to find work. A similar
story may be unfolding in the UK.
What are the implications of these findings for the theory, discussed in
chapter 1? The Pissarides (1994) model is consistent with labour market
dynamics in the UK, over the period considered here, in that the recent
recession is shown to be a time when more people started job-search.
This model could be used as a basis for modelling the observed cyclical
properties of job-search.
It is demonstrated that both the job-finding rate and job-separation
rate are significant in explaining the dynamic behaviour of
unemployment in the UK. Gomes (2009, 2012), along with Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2008), shows that the two factors are close to being
equally important determinants of unemployment dynamics in the
UK.19 A robust theoretical model of the UK labour market should
therefore generate a procyclical job-finding rate and a countercyclical
job-separation rate, that both behave in a volatile manner. Such a
model may wish to consider how the relative importance of the
job-finding and job-separation rate could differ with the severity of the
downturn, as emphasised by Davis et al. (2006). A salient additional
finding of this thesis is that the hiring rate decline appears to have been
driven primarily by a fall in JJ flows, and this is something future
theory may wish to acknowledge.
19Whether this holds for the US or other OECD economies is another matter, but
it appears that there is a role for both factors in the UK.
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Many theoretical and empirical questions remain unanswered (or
not fully and satisfactorily answered), however. These include: the
conundrum over whether the search-and-matching needs to be refined
to account for, say, the rigid wages hypothesis of Shimer (2004, 2010);
whether job destruction should be endogenous or exogenous; whether
matching theory is the optimal lens through which to view aggregate
unemployment, given its limitations; and how one is to overcome
problems with the available data, such as time-aggregation bias.
Although in some ways limited, and even though it is not necessarily
intrinsically important in determining labour market outcomes
(Rogerson and Shimer, 2011), it appears that matching theory has the
sturdiest empirical support in explaining the dynamic behaviour of
aggregate unemployment. Its main rival, the theory of efficiency wages,
relies on some strong assumptions, and, intuitively, it cannot explain
the type of unemployment one actually observes. Nor can it provide a
credible explanation of involuntary unemployment, as, in the
Shapiro-Stiglitz model (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), more skilled
workers are more likely to experience periods of unemployment than
the general worker.
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Conclusion
Underpinning the unemployment rate is a complex pattern of (sizeable)
flows between the three labour market states. This thesis reveals that,
between the official start of the recession (in 2008 Q2) and 2010 Q1, there
was a net decrease of 304,000 in the level of employment (a net decrease
of 38,000 people per quarter). Meanwhile, net unemployment increased
by 696,000 (a rise of 87,000 people per quarter), and net inactivity has
fallen by 392,000 (a quarterly drop of 49,000 people). Recent quarters,
however, show a marked improvement in the functioning of the labour
market.
In spite of potential measurement biases exhibited by gross flows
data, some interesting patterns emerge. The contributions of this work
have been to demonstrate that the prominent features exhibited by the
recession, in terms of gross worker flows, have been:
1. a proportional decrease of around 3.20% (equivalent to roughly
2.40 percentage points) in the employment rate, and a
proportional increase of almost 50% (equivalent to approximately
2.50 percentage points) in the unemployment rate;
2. an increased number of flows from employment to unemployment,
and a higher probability of making such a transition;
3. increased flows out of unemployment into both employment and
inactivity — the increase in the flow to inactivity has been more
sizeable and immediate, although, as noted in section 3.2, the
longitudinal nature of the data is likely to bias this flow upwards;
4. a lower probability of moving from unemployment to employment;
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5. fewer flows and a lesser chance of transitioning from inactivity to
employment;
6. increased flows and a greater chance of transitioning from inactivity
to unemployment;
7. a considerable decline in job-to-job movements and the likelihood
of moving between jobs (both for those who are looking for a new
job and those who are not);
8. men faring decidedly worse than women, in terms of overall rates
of employment and unemployment.
These results are broadly similar to those presented in Bell and
Smith (2002) and Gomes (2009, 2012). Analysis of a data set
incorporating a downturn, however, gives one salient additional finding:
job-to-job flows are shown to have fallen strikingly since the start of the
recession, and this appears to have been the major force driving the
observed fall in the hiring rate. In turn, as both the job-finding rate
and the job-separation rate are shown to have contributed substantially
to the dynamic behaviour of UK unemployment, the fall in job-to-job
flows has implicitly been one of the main factors associated with the
rise in UK unemployment since the official start of the recession. The
other main contributions are the use of detrended Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) as the cyclical indicator (as opposed to another labour
market indicator) and a split-sample analysis, which flags some
interesting trend changes in labour market flow movements and
transition rates, even prior to the Great Recession (for example, the
general downward trend in job-to-job movements).
Since the onset of recession, both the job-finding rate and the
job-separation rate have behaved in a volatile manner. This finding is
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consistent with Bell and Smith (2002) who find that employment inflow
and outflow rates are equally volatile, and Gomes (2009, 2012), who
finds that both the job-finding rate and job-separation rate are
significant in explaining unemployment dynamics in the UK. It is also
demonstrated the effect of the recession on labour market outcomes has
been markedly worse for men than women. S¸ahin et al. (2010) found
the same in a study of the US labour market. The finding is perhaps
attributable to it being more likely for women to be offered, and to
accept, a reduction in working hours; because male-dominated
industries were hit harder by the recession; and, perhaps, due to
inactive men re-entering the labour force due to household liquidity
constraints, but failing to find work.
The recession has shed further light on the magnitude and cyclical
properties of gross worker flows in the UK. These insights are of interest
to macroeconomists, labour economists, and policy-makers alike. Aside
from the intriguing empirical findings laid out above, the paper further
demonstrates that a robust theoretical model of the UK labour market
should generate a procyclical job-finding rate and a countercyclical job-
separation rate, that both behave in a volatile manner.
This thesis supports the findings of Gomes (2009, 2012) that, in the
UK, the job-finding rate and the job-separation rate both play an
important role in determining unemployment fluctuations. While the
Pissarides (2000) model seemingly fails to explain the observed cyclical
volatility of its key variable, the V /U ratio (labour market ‘tightness’),
and perhaps too much weight is given to the job-separation rate in
determining unemployment fluctuations (particularly in an economic
downturn), it is clear to see that employment inflows are not acyclical
(or, indeed, nearly acyclical), which discredits the Shimer (2012)
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hypothesis.
There is certainly weight, as evidenced in this thesis, for the Davis
et al. (2006) suggestion that unemployment inflows drive unemployment
dynamics during severe downturns, whereas unemployment outflows
drive unemployment dynamics during milder downturns in the UK.
Therefore, a promising route for future theory to take would be to use a
model that considers how the relative importance of the job-finding and
job-separation rates could differ with the severity of the downturn.
Economists, in such a model, may also want to incorporate the result
that job-search is seemingly countercyclical — a prediction that can be
generated by a model similar to that presented by Pissarides (1994) —
and may try to explain the observed decline in the hiring rate, which
appears to have been driven primarily by a fall in JJ flows.
There are a few obvious directions of travel in light of this thesis.
The first, and most obvious, would be to extend the data set to see if
the patterns borne out over the period assessed also held into 2014.
Basic intuition suggests that some strong cyclical patterns would
continue to be found, in light of the continual and persistent fall in the
claimant count measure of unemployment (changes in which tend to be
a good predictor of the slightly less contemporaneous International
Labour Organization — ILO — measure of unemployment). Second,
potential further disaggregation of the flows data could usefully be
undertaken: splitting flows by education levels, splitting inactive
workers into marginally attached and distant from the labour market,
and the contrast between the quit and layoff elements of the
job-separation rate (the former of which we expect to be procyclical
and the latter of which countercylical) could be useful distinctions to
make. Third, a more sophisticated approach to decomposing
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unemployment inflows and outflow rates could have been used, in line
with the methods applied by, amongst others, Fujita and Ramey
(2009), Smith (2011), and Shimer (2012). It would also be appropriate
to extend the transition rate analyses to incorporate other pertinent
factors, such as net migration and population growth, as well as
allowing, in the theoretical set-up, for job-to-job movements, which
have been shown to be of considerable importance in this thesis.
Finally, assessment of whether the rigid wages hypothesis could help to
reconcile the competitive search-and-matching model with UK data
may also be an interesting avenue for research in this area, given its
importance in the US.
This having been said, UK unemployment has proved not to be
particularly volatile over the business cycle, when compared to the
impact on output: the impact of the Great Recession was markedly
damper on the labour market than on GDP, and the recovery of the
latter has been far more sluggish. Research as to why this has been the
case is most pressing, with questions raised around whether it is an
economic issue, or labour market statistics are masking what is, in
actual fact, a worse economic situation than the aggregates might
imply. It would be interesting to see if more contemporaneous analysis
of labour market flows and wider labour market data are able to shed
light on the troubling — and as not satisfactorily-explained — UK
productivity puzzle. Analysis of further disaggregated flows data may
well help to shed light on other pressing economic questions, such as
why tax revenues have been under-predicted in 2014-15 (Office for
Budget Responsibility, 2014). (One might reasonably conjecture that
increased movements into low-paid industries and the increasing
incidence of low-paid self-employment are explanations that allow
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economists to reconcile a high employment rate and
weaker-than-expected tax receipts.) In this sense, labour market data
can shed light on the most fundamental economic questions facing the
UK: namely, how the government will meet its fiscal mandate and
supplementary debt target in the face of increased spending over which
it has little control (Annually Managed Expenditure) and
weaker-than-anticipated receipts. Conclusive findings in this regard can
also shape the direction of future policy, providing a clearer focus for
future policy initiatives. Whether the finding above that the job-finding
and job-separation rates are equally important determinants of UK
unemployment dynamics still holds true when more contemporaneous
data are analysed is an important question for the direction of UK
labour market policy: should policy be geared towards job creation,
preventing job destruction, or some mixture of both that reflects the
relative importance of each factor?
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Appendix
Transition Correlation Coefficient of
Unemployment Rate Series
With:
Average Size of
Quarterly
Gross Worker
Flow as a
Percentage of
Working-Age
Population
Gross Flow Hazard Rate
E → U 0.77** 0.79** 0.99
E → I -0.51** -0.44** 1.38
U → E 0.71** -0.83** 1.25
U → I 0.89** -0.66** 0.83
I → E -0.68** -0.71** 1.32
I → U 0.76** 0.79** 1.05
Job-to-Job -0.65** -0.55** 2.77†
Job-to-Job (S ) -0.52** -0.64** 0.86†
Job-to-Job (NS ) -0.72** -0.58** 1.85†
→ E 0.03 -0.84** 2.57
E → 0.38** 0.45** 2.37
→ U 0.85** 0.85** 2.04
U → 0.89** -0.86** 0.83
→ I 0.46** -0.68** 2.21
I → 0.24* 0.21 2.37
Table A1.a. Cyclical Properties of Labour Market Flows and Hazards —
Correlation Coefficients Between Labour Market Flows and Hazards and
the Unemployment Rate: UK, 1997 Q2 — 2010 Q3
91
Transition Correlation Coefficient of
Unemployment Rate Series
With:
Average Size of
Quarterly
Gross Worker
Flow as a
Percentage of
Working-Age
Population
Gross Flow Hazard Rate
E → U 0.73** 0.85** 0.98
E → I -0.35* -0.02 1.42
U → E 0.80** -0.74** 1.29
U → I 0.89** -0.53** 0.81
I → E -0.38* -0.24 1.33
I → U 0.72** 0.77** 0.98
Job-to-Job 0.08 0.37* 3.06†
Job-to-Job (S ) 0.35* -0.08 0.96†
Job-to-Job (NS ) -0.16 0.22 2.06†
→ E 0.42* -0.74** 2.62
E → 0.21 0.59** 2.39
→ U 0.82** 0.84** 1.96
U → 0.90** -0.76** 0.81
→ I 0.39* -0.52** 2.22
I → 0.22 0.39* 2.31
Table A1.b. Cyclical Properties of Labour Market Flows and Hazards
— Correlation Coefficients Between Labour Market Flows and Hazards
and the Unemployment Rate: UK, 1997 Q2 — 2003 Q4
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Transition Correlation Coefficient of
Unemployment Rate Series
With:
Average Size of
Quarterly
Gross Worker
Flow as a
Percentage of
Working-Age
Population
Gross Flow Hazard Rate
E → U 0.78** 0.78** 1.00
E → I -0.59** -0.56** 1.35
U → E 0.69** -0.86** 1.22
U → I 0.92** -0.73** 0.86
I → E -0.82** -0.84** 1.31
I → U 0.91** 0.89** 1.12
Job-to-Job -0.87** -0.88** 2.49†
Job-to-Job (S ) -0.82** -0.84** 0.76†
Job-to-Job (NS ) -0.92** -0.91** 1.66†
→ E -0.13 -0.87** 2.52
E → 0.41* 0.44* 2.35
→ U 0.92** 0.93** 2.12
U → 0.89** -0.88** 0.86
→ I 0.48** -0.76** 2.21
I → 0.21 0.06 2.43
Table A1.c. Cyclical Properties of Labour Market Flows and Hazards —
Correlation Coefficients Between Labour Market Flows and Hazards and
the Unemployment Rate: UK, 2004 Q1 — 2010 Q3
Sources: LFS, Gomes (2012) data set for job-to-job flows, and author analysis
Notes: The average sizes of the gross flows are calculated from the raw
(seasonally-unadjusted) data.
† Job-to-Job flows are expressed as a percentage of total employment
S = Searching; NS = Not Searching
** = Statistically significant from zero at the 1% level; * = Statistically significant
from zero at the 5% level
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